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Wilkinson famously eulogized the Prior Appropriations 
system in 1991.1 Recent Supreme Court cases raise the question of 
whether such a eulogy is now appropriate for the Commerce Clause 
as it relates to bulk water transfers across state lines. During the 
1980s several key cases settled doubt that water is article of 
commerce and a commodity.2 The fungible nature of water 
frustrates water resource managers and economists alike, meaning 
                                                 
1 Charles Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior Appropriation 1848-1991. 
21 ENVTL. L. 3. (1991). This work was followed by Benson, R. D. (2011). 
Alive but irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today's Western 
Water Law. U. Colo. L. Rev., 83, 675. 
2 Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). City of El Paso v. 
Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 D.N.M. (1983). 
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it is ‘property’ that does not exhibit all ‘traditional’ properties of 
ownership.3 The legal commoditization of water corresponded with 
an increase in academic research calling for open markets for bulk 
water sales, allowing for water to be reallocated to higher economic 
uses.4 Sporhase v. Nebraska and City of El Paso v. Reynolds were 
instrumental in knocking down economically protectionist statutes, 
creating a trend towards a ‘borderless commons’ for resource 
reallocation.5 Fast forward to 2014 and bulk water transfers are still 
                                                 
3 Olen P. Matthews, Fundamental Questions about Water Rights and 
Market Reallocation, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. No. 9 W09S08 (2004).  
George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-party Effects, 23 
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW 1-41 (1988); Olen P. Matthews, Water 
is not Real Property. 85 WATER RESOURCES UPDATE 19 (1991).  
4 Dinar, A., & Letey, J. (1991). Agricultural Water Marketing, 
Allocative Efficiency, and Drainage Reduction. JOURNAL OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT, 20(3), 210-223 
(1991).  MacDonnell, L. J.  Recent Developments in Water Marketing and 
Water Transfers. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH AND 
EDUCATION, 79(1), 5 (2011).  Anderson, T. L., & Turner, J. A. Marketing 
the West’s Life Blood. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH 
AND EDUCATION, 92(1), 4 (2011). 
5 Borderless commons is also referred to as a borderless national 
market. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant 
Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICHIGAN L. REV. 395 
(1989). 
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fraught with problems,6 including unclear property rights, and high 
costs of transport.7 
 Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann ET AL has 
brought the transferability of water across state lines into question.8 
Tarrant Regional Water District (Tarrant) provides water to suburbs 
of Dallas including Fort Worth. The district’s population has been 
fast growing.9 To keep pace with growing water demands,10 Tarrant 
has actively sought to acquire water using a variety of means, 
including purchasing water rights from parties in multiple states and 
                                                 
6 Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: 
The Myth of Markets for Water, WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
317-77 (2000). 
7 For a thorough review of types of transaction costs associated with 
natural resource transactions, see K. Krutilla, Transaction Costs and 
Environmental Policy: An Assessment Framework and Literature Review, 
4 INT’L REV. OF ENVTL. AND RESOURCE ECON., 261-354 (2010); K. 
Krutilla, & A. Alexeev, The Political Transaction Costs and Uncertainties 
of Establishing Environmental Rights, 107 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 299-309 
(2014).  
8 Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann ET AL. 569 U.S. 
614, 614 (2013). 
9 Id. 
10 The 2007 Texas State Water Plan estimates Dallas-Ft. Worth 
water demands to increase from approximately 1.2 million acre-feet per 
year in 2000 to 3.35 million acres—feet per year by 2060. See, e.g., 
TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD 2007, 
http://www.twdb.texas.gov/waterplanning/swp/2007/index.asp. 
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attempting to appropriate water in Oklahoma for use in Texas.11 In 
Tarrant, the Supreme Court prevented Tarrant from obtaining a 
water right in Oklahoma based on the Red River Compact.  
On its face, Tarrant required the court to address commerce 
clause limitations on Oklahoma water allocation statutes, while 
simultaneously delving into whether an interstate compact pre-
empted state law. However, instead of using Oklahoma water law to 
claim unappropriated water within the Kiamichi River Basin, 
Tarrant claimed the existence of unallocated water under the Red 
River Compact. This circumvention of the normal appropriation 
process allowed the Court to evaluate the compact using contract 
law principles; the Court then determined the compact’s language 
showed insufficient intent to pre-empt Oklahoma’s statutes. The 
Court avoided any significant discussion of the commerce clause. 
That said, the decision runs contrary to contemporary trends in both 
water resource management, which call for integrated watershed-
                                                 
11 Tarrant attempted to make an appropriation of unappropriated 
water on the Kiamichi River in Oklahoma. 
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level management,12 and neo-classical economics, which call for 
borderless-markets for efficient commoditization and reallocation 
of resources.13 The decision also runs contrary to the Court’s 
previous decisions to ignore state boundaries when both states use 
the Prior Appropriations system.14  
The Supreme Court framed Tarrant’s position as follows: 1) 
The Red River Compact pre-empts Oklahoma statutes giving 
Tarrant “the right to cross state lines and divert water from 
Oklahoma”15 within a specific portion of the river where the 
Compact grants “equal rights to the runoff.”16 “In Tarrant’s view, 
this provision essentially creates a borderless commons in which 
each of the four signatory States may cross each other’s boundaries 
                                                 
12 C. Howe, The Return to the River Basin: The Increasing Cost of 
“Jurisdictional Externalities”, 131 J. OF CONTEMP. WATER RES. AND 
EDUC. 26-31 (2005).   
13 David S. Brookshire, et al., Ecosystem Services and Reallocation 
Choices: A Framework for Preserving Semi-Arid Regions in the 
Southwest, 144 J. OF CONTEMP. WATER RES. AND EDUC. 60-74 (2010). 
14 See, State of Montana v State of Wyoming and State of North 
Dakota 131 U.S. 1765 (2011); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 
(1922).   
15 Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann ET AL., 569 U.S. 
614 (2013) at 9. 
16 Id. at 615. 
2019] Borderless Commons 89 
to access a shared pool of water.”17 2) “Tarrant argues that the 
Oklahoma water statutes impermissibly “‘discriminat[e ] against 
interstate commerce’ for the ‘forbidden purpose’ of favoring local 
interests” by erecting barriers to the distribution of water left 
unallocated under the Compact” (emphasis added).18 In rejecting 
these arguments, the Court makes statements raising critical issues 
for water managers.  
First, the Court ignores the fact authority over water is 
shared—not exclusive. Placing substantial emphasis on 
“sovereignty” provided the Court with the justification for finding 
the Red River Compact does not pre-empt Oklahoma water 
allocation law.19 However, the sovereignty argument ignores the 
historic interplay and tensions between state and federal authority 
over water; it also disregards the requirement for sharing between 
states. Water is an inherently shared resource that cannot fit under 
traditional notions of ownership and sovereignty.20 While ignoring 
                                                 
17 Id. at 616. 
18 Id. at 617. 
19 Id.  
20 Olen P. Matthews, The Dominate Water Estate and Water 
Reallocation, 144 J. OF CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. (2010); George 
90 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
the shared nature of water management the Court seems to indicate 
there is something unmanageable with a “borderless common in 
which each of the fours signatory States may cross each other’s 
boundaries to access a shared pool of water.”21 Such reasoning is 
peculiar because political boundaries are artificial constructs 
running contrary to watershed management. Although a completely 
borderless commons may not be politically feasible, reducing 
borders as much as practicable is a commonly stated water 
management goal22, as well as fundamental principle of neo-
                                                 
A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND AND 
WATER L. REV. 1 (1988). 
21 Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann ET AL. 569 U.S. 614 
(2013) at 627-28. “But if §5.05(b)(1)’s silence instead reflects a 
background understanding on the part of the Compact’s drafters that state 
borders were to be respected within the Compact’s allocation, then the 
Oklahoma statutes do not conflict with the Compact’s allocation of water.” 
22 Water managers frequently cite a common goal of integrated 
(holistic) watershed management. J. Hoornbeek, & E. Hansen, (2013). 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) in the United States: An 
Inquiry into the Role of Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs). INT’L J. 
OF WATER GOVERNANCE, 1 (3), 339-360 (2013); Eve Vogel, Parceling 
Out the Watershed: The Recurring Consequences of Organizing Columbia 
River Management within a Basin-Based Territory. WATER 
ALTERNATIVES 5(1), 161-190 (2012). “This goal can only be achieved by 
erasing the boundaries as much as possible.” Olen P. Matthews and Dan 
St. Germaine, Boundaries and Transboundary Water Conflicts, 133 J. OF 
WATER RES. PLANNING AND MGMT. 386-396 (2007). Water managers 
frequently cite a common goal of integrated (holistic) watershed 
management. 
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classical economics. A borderless commons could have a positive 
impact on water management. Second, by narrowing Tarrant’s 
commerce clause arguments to water “left unallocated under the 
compact”, the whole issue of Oklahoma’s blatant and intentionally 
discriminatory statutes is left unresolved. These two points form the 
focus for our discussion below.   
Because of the Red River Compact’s singular language and 
Tarrant’s argument based on “unallocated” water, the implications 
of this case are unclear. But this precedent brings into question the 
ability to divert or market water across state boundaries. Interpreted 
at its margin this decision represents a reversal of trends towards a 
national free-market of water as a commoditized good.23 We argue 
that Tarrant, in spite of some language within the decision, should 
not fundamentally constrain water transfers across state boundaries. 
II.  SHARED AUTHORITY OVER WATER 
John Wesley Powell recognized dividing watersheds with 
state boundaries would create water management problems.24 His 
                                                 
23 See, Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); City of El Paso 
v. Reynolds 563 F. Supp. 379 D.N.M. (1983). 
24 JOHN W. POWELL, A REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE 
ARID REGION OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (2nd ed. 1878). 
92 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
fear of states incessantly fighting over borders, water allocation, and 
fishing rights, instead of managing watersheds as an interdependent 
resource, was prescient.25 His recommendation of using watershed 
boundaries as political borders instead of rivers was ignored, and 
States have been at odds ever since. In 1879 when Powell made his 
report, individual water users in the arid West were ignored at the 
federal level giving states leeway to develop a system for allocating 
                                                 
25 Powell’s A Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United 
States, suggested using watershed boundaries instead of rivers as political 
boundaries. He also suggested development in the western United States 
needed to occur with recognition of the limited freshwater supplies. Id. at 
27. 
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water.26 Powell did not foresee the heavy federal presence that 
evolved subsequently.27   
A. The Fiction of State Sovereignty 
In Tarrant, the Court draws on an 1842 Supreme Court 
decision28 based on river bed ownership to describe the attributes of 
sovereignty. “We have long understood that as sovereign entities in 
our federal system, the states possess an ‘absolute right to all their 
                                                 
26 The federal government did not have the resources in the sparsely 
settled West to resolve water disputes even if they desired. Local custom 
evolved instead which in the later part of the 1800s became the basis for 
the western states’ appropriation doctrine. A similar process happened 
with mining law in the West. In the early 1800s the U.S. developed a lease 
system for minerals on the frontier. The lease law was unenforceable 
partly because the program was inadequately administered. For example, 
rents were only collected for one year between 1836 and 1846. See, e.g., 
Robert W. Swenson, Legal Aspects of Mineral Resources Exploitation in 
GATES, PAUL W. HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW 
DEVELOPMENT at 705 (1968). The lease system was abandoned in 1846 
the sale of specific mineralized lands was authorized. California was not 
included in the authorization. When gold was discovered in 1849 the 
California miners were in fact trespassing on federal land when they 
extracted minerals. A vacuum existed at the local level and mining camps 
developed their own rules for establishing property rights and resolving 
disputes. In time these local practices were codified as the Mining Law of 
1866 and 1872. Arguably a federal system for allocating water could have 
developed, especially on federal land and in the territories. See also, Irwin 
v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855). These same miners needed water for their 
placer claims and local customs based on “first in time, first in right” 
evolved for water as well. 
27 Supra note 26. 
28 Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
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navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common 
use’” (emphasis added).29 Most definitions of sovereignty use terms 
like “supreme and absolute power”, “paramount political authority”, 
or “absolute right to govern.”30 But, is sovereignty a concept that 
applies to water? Within an international context sovereign states 
(countries)31 are independent and exercise jurisdiction over their 
territory, resources, and citizens. Even sovereign countries have 
obligations under international law which restrict the “absolute” 
exercise of power.32 Obligations are especially important since 
absolute power over water can be exercised in ways that cause 
substantial harm to other country’s interests. Water is a mobile 
resource with individual molecules moving through the hydrologic 
cycle independent of political boundaries. Indeed, only one of the 
                                                 
29 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N. J. Law, 1 at 14-15. (Since the issue in the 
case was the ownership of the river bed (soil beneath the navigable water) 
the reference to the water itself is dicta.). 
30 Black’s Law Dictionary available at thelawdictionary.org. 
31 We will use the term country when referring to an internationally 
recognized state to avoid confusion with the term state which is also used 
for governing units within the U.S. federal system. 
32 For example, the Mekong River Basin Commission is an inter-
governmental agency that has worked to create clear expectations of each 
nation on how it treats the Mekong River and its principal tributaries.  
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world’s 264 large river basins is undivided by a political boundary.33 
This necessitates some form of sharing. 
Four major theoretical approaches have been advocated for 
governing international waters.34 First, “absolute territorial 
sovereignty”35 allows upstream countries to use water as they chose 
with no obligation to prevent harm to downstream countries. This 
seems to be the position taken by the Supreme Court in Tarrant.36 
Second, “absolute riverine integrity” prevents upstream countries 
from reducing the full natural flow of the river thereby benefiting 
downstream countries. Third, “equitable utilization” limits 
territorial sovereignty by allowing each country to use an equitable 
and reasonable share of the water. Fourth, the “community theory” 
                                                 
33 The Murray-Darling River Basin is entirely within Australia. The 
other 263 largest basins cross at least one international boundary. Shim 
Yoffe, Shira, Aaron T. Wolf, and Mark Giordano, Conflict and 
Cooperation over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators of 
Basins at Risk, 39 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN WATER RESOURCES 
ASSOCIATION (2003) at 1109. 
34 Joseph W. Dellapenna, International Water Law, in Water and 
Water Rights, §49.03 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991). 
35 Carolin Spiegel, International Water Law: The Contributions of 
Western United States Water Law to the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Non-navigable uses of International Watercourses, 15 DUKE 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) at 348. 
36 The Circuit Court decision seems even more extreme in its 
embrace of this approach.   
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advocates river basin development as a unit without regard for 
political boundaries. Although, the first two doctrines have been 
advocated at different times these have never been accepted at 
international law37 equitable utilization is the current standard.38 The 
community theory is more recent and would virtually erase the 
political boundary. Equitable utilization at international law goes 
beyond the concept of equitable apportionment which will be 
discussed below. Equitable apportionment as developed by the US 
Supreme Court requires the benefits of water use be shared and not 
just the allocation of water. 
Kansas v. Colorado, a dispute over the Arkansas River, 
illustrates how several of these theoretical approaches were 
articulated. 39 In 1906, large dams and major diversions for irrigation 
and other purposes were just becoming technically feasible. 
International water law was largely limited to navigation disputes as 
were most disputes between U.S. states. This controversy helped 
                                                 
37 U.S. advocated absolute territorial sovereignty Harmon Doctrine. 
See also, state arguments in Kansas v. Colorado. 
38 International Law Association. Berlin Conference 2004. Water 
Resources Law. Fourth Report at 4. 
39 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
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shape early international water allocation law because of the way 
the Court approached a dispute between equal sovereigns. The 
international aspect of sovereignty is illustrated by the Court’s 
stating it was “sitting …as an international, as well as a domestic 
tribunal.”40 Colorado was following the approach espoused in 1895 
by Attorney General Judson Harmon.41 The Harmon Doctrine 
evolved as the result of a dispute over the Rio Grande between the 
U.S. and Mexico but was later repudiated.42  
 Kansas as the downstream state argued for absolute riverine 
integrity. “The State of Kansas appeals to the rule of the common 
law that owners of lands on the banks of a river are entitled to the 
continual flow of the stream…”43 Flowing water provided an energy 
source for mill wheels with water being valued more for its energy 
than for other uses. Interfering with the flow harmed the mills. The 
                                                 
40 Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146 (1902). 
41 Judson Harmon, 21 Op. U.S. Att’y Gen. 281 (1895). 
42 This doctrine never developed as the standard under international 
law and arguably was not actually used by the United States. See, Stephen 
C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, 
Not Praised, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549, 565 (1996). 
43 Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146 (1902). 
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natural flow theory would require Colorado to leave the river 
untouched benefiting downstream Kansas.44 
In their subsequent decision the Court adopted the standard 
of “equitable apportionment.”45 This new federal common law 
doctrine articulated a principle based on sharing, but Kansas was not 
allocated a share of the river because they could not prove they were 
being harmed. 
“[W]e are not satisfied that Kansas has made out a 
case entitling it to a decree. At the same time it is 
obvious that if the depletion of the waters of the river 
by Colorado continues to increase there will come a 
time when Kansas may justly say that there is no 
longer an equitable division of benefits and may 
rightfully call for relief against the action of 
Colorado, its corporations and citizens in 
                                                 
44 As the Court points out accepting this theory would not necessarily 
benefit Kansas irrigators since the next downstream state could make the 
same argument. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). This point was 
noticed by irrigators in western Kansas who objected to the use of this 
doctrine. See, JAMES E. SHEROW, WATERING THE VALLEY: 
DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE HIGH PLAINS ARKANSAS RIVER, 
1870-1950, University Press, Kansas (1990). 
45 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 at 47 (1907). The idea that state 
sovereignty could be limited when one state harmed another had already 
been accepted by the Court in a water quality dispute over the Illinois 
River. A public nuisance created in one state causing harm in another was 
within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Although state sovereignty was 
restricted by enunciating the principle, the harm to the downstream state 
could not be proven. Missouri v. Illinois and Chicago, 200 U.S. 496 
(1906).   
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appropriating the waters of the Arkansas for 
irrigation purposes.” (emphasis added)46  
The Court did leave open the door by stating Kansas could  
“institute new proceedings whenever it shall appear 
that through a material increase in the depletion of 
the waters of the Arkansas, …the substantial 
interests of Kansas are being injured to the extent of 
destroying the equitable apportionment of benefits 
between the two States resulting from the flow of 
the river.”(emphasis added)47 
The doctrine of equitable apportionment evolved as a 
limitation on a state’s territorial sovereignty creating an obligation 
on upstream states to share the benefits of the water originating 
within their boundaries.48 As this standard evolved it has been 
limited to an actual apportionment of a “share” or quantity of water 
rather than an apportionment of the “benefits” of the water use. This 
is playing out in the current dispute in the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) Basin, as Georgia and Florida seem 
entrenched in their respective positions on flow dimensions and 
                                                 
46 Id. at 47. 
47 Id. at 47-48. 
48 The exact nature of the elements that create an “equitable 
apportionment” were eventually defined but were left open ended and 
flexible. Although the rules have been articulated for an equitable 
apportionment, the Supreme Court rarely actually apportions a quantity of 
water and prefers states resolve disputes through compacts. 
100 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
equity.49 The two states invoked an Interstate Compact, but the 
compact expired in 2003.50 Even the use of a “Special Master”51 did 
not create a determination of equity the Court deemed satisfactory. 
As a result litigation over flows in the ACF is ongoing. 
In 1966, the Helsinki Rules, a precursor in the evolution of 
international water law, stated “each basin state is entitled, within 
its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses 
of the waters of an international drainage basin.”52 This is the 
doctrine of “beneficial uses,” which is perhaps closer to the Supreme 
Court’s original articulation which included an “equitable division 
of benefits” and certainly implies more than just an allocation of a 
quantity of water. As international law has evolved there may be 
                                                 
49 Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018). 
50 Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact P.L. 
105-104 (1997). 
51 The Special Master’s recommendation suggested Georgia receive 
a disproportionate quantity of water in this system stating, “Florida has not 
proven by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed 
by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin.” Id. 51 at 2502. 
The Court determined the Special Master “applied too strict a standard 
when he determined that the Court would not be able to fashion an 
appropriate equitable degree.” (See footnote 51 at 2516). This suggests the 
Court will, if no negotiated settlement is reached, judicially allocate 
waters.   
52 The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers, Chapter 2, Article 6 (1966). 
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even more limitations on sovereignty than exist in disputes between 
U.S. states. International law emphasizes the “fairness” or “equities” 
“rather than… a strict application of legal rights.”53 Thus sharing the 
benefits includes a share in the hydroelectricity generated by a dam 
located entirely within one country. Although equitable utilization 
includes sharing the benefits of water use, it allows independent 
development on each side of a boundary, and the boundary is not 
completely erased.   
The doctrine of “equitable participation” goes one step 
further and includes integrated watershed-scale management, the 
process looking at the entire river basin when making water 
management decisions.54 Water managers have long advocated this 
as a way of optimizing water use. Although there is a growing 
movement toward integrated management at the international level 
it is not fully articulated. “Many modern treaties apparently take the 
principle of shared rights or common use as a presumed starting 
point of departure and proceed without articulating any general rule, 
                                                 
53 Joesph W. Dellapenna, International Water Law, in Water and 
Water Rights, §49.05(b)91 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991). 
54 Id. 
102 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
to spell out the specifics of their sharing of responsibilities….”55 In 
1997, a U.N. Convention specifically recognized a duty to 
cooperate, consult and negotiate.56 The Berlin Rules also recognize 
a duty to consult and negotiate.57 
At the international level limitations are imposed by U.N. 
conventions on sovereignty in transboundary watersheds58. This is a 
long way from the absolute power advocated under the Harmon 
Doctrine. In many ways the international obligations and limitations 
on sovereignty far exceed those that exist for U.S. states. There is a 
difference, however. In the U.S., a “superior” federal government 
also has power over water. The U.S. Constitution also limits state 
powers and puts in place mechanisms for resolving disputes 
between states.  Sovereignty does NOT mean absolute power when 
it comes to water; it never has. To further understand these 
                                                 
55 Stephen M. Schwebel (Special Rapporteur of Int’l Comm’n), 
Third Rep. on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/348 (1982). 
56 U.N. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/51/49 (May 21, 1997). 
57 Id. 
58 Aaron T. Wolf, A Long Term View of Water and International 
Security, 142 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 67, 67-75 (2009). 
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limitations on state power, the balance between state and federal 
power over water needs to be examined. 
B. Balancing Federal and State Power 
Federal regulatory power over water has gradually increased 
over time. This evolution is comparable to the changing 
relationships between the state and federal governments within the 
U.S. federal system.59 One significant dividing point is the 
Reclamation Act of 1902. Prior to this, the exercise of federal power 
was generally limited to navigation. Government roles before the 
Reclamation Act are discussed in the first section below. The 
Reclamation Act itself was a compromise between federal power 
and local interests as will be discussed in the second part. 
Subsequent federal statutes used other constitutional justifications 
other than the navigation justification. As long as there was a 
constitutionally enumerated power, this federal expansion was 
                                                 
59 Four components of this federal system have been identified: 1) 
state sovereignty and constitutional limits on that sovereignty; 2) federal 
power; 3) relationship between federal and state governments; and 4) 
relationship between the states. All four of these components are important 
in understanding how water is managed. None of the components can be 
looked at in isolation. Thus, state sovereignty can only be understood by 
also examining the constitutional limits on sovereignty, federal power, and 
the obligations to other states; Robert A. Sadler, The Constitution and the 
American Federal System, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1487, 1488 (2004). 
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upheld. The main constitutional powers exercised are under the 
Commerce Clause and the Property Clause as discussed in the third 
section. Lastly, this article will discuss congressional 
apportionment. Over the past 100 years the scale of water 
management issues has changed, and the balance between state and 
federal power has shifted as the role water plays in development, 
ecosystem services, and agricultural and fisheries production has 
been better understood and re-evaluated. 
1. Pre- “Reclamation Era” roles 
Before 1902 the federal role in water management was 
limited in scope. This is partly due to the scale of the management 
concerns of that era. Except for navigation, most water management 
issues were local. During this period the balance between state and 
federal power depended on the definition of “navigable water.”60 
The Constitution does not specifically mention water, but the 
Commerce Clause affirmatively gives the federal government the 
power to “regulate commerce” which includes power over 
                                                 
60 The designation of a navigable waterbody means actions 
interfering with navigable commerce must be precluded; United States v 
Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967). 
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navigation.61 With an almost non-existent road system water 
transportation was the backbone for moving goods from one place 
to another when the U.S. was founded. The federal Commerce 
Clause power is not exclusive; states also retain the capacity to 
regulate commerce.62 State attempts to restrict “commerce” through 
protectionist laws led to the evolution of the dormant or negative 
Commerce Clause.63 Protectionist state laws are consistently 
deemed unconstitutional, as will be discussed in more detail 
below.64  
Whether federal power extended beyond navigable waters 
was an open question. Other federal constitutional powers like the 
Property Clause, treaty power, and spending power potentially 
granted the federal government authority to directly or indirectly 
affect water. Generally, issues concerning these other constitutional 
                                                 
61 Gibbons v. Ogden, 221 U.S. 1 (1824). 
62 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
63 Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 
27 U.S. 245 (1829); See generally Norman G. Williams, Gibbons, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398 (2004); M.H. Redish and S. V. Nuegent, 1987 The 
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of 
Federalism. DUKE L. REV. 4, 569-618 (1987). 
64 Sporhase, supra note 24; Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. 
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992).  
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powers did not arise with regard to water in the 1800s. The rule was 
clear that, if Congress exercised one of its specific constitutional 
powers, that law was supreme and pre-empted contradictory state 
laws.65 
With federal power over navigable waters being well settled 
in the 1800s, it became a regular practice for Congress to pass an 
annual Rivers and Harbors bill financing navigation 
improvements.66 Politicians of that era did not feel there was 
constitutional authorization for federal flood control levees and 
reservoirs, federal projects to drain wetlands, or federal reclamation 
projects.67 On the other hand, the benefits to the local politicians 
from navigation improvements were well recognized and the almost 
annual Rivers and Harbors Acts were broadly supported.68  
Non-navigational federal water initiatives that could not be 
developed through direct means were accomplished indirectly. Two 
                                                 
65 Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
66 See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1879, 21 Stat. 37 (created the 
Mississippi River Commission to improve navigation on the river). 
67 See generally, ELLIS L. ARMSTRONG, ET AL., HISTORY OF PUBLIC 
WORKS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1976 (Amer. Public Works Assoc., 
1976). 
68 See generally, O.P. MATTHEWS, WATER RESOURCES: 
GEOGRAPHY AND LAW (Assoc. of Amer. Geographers, 1984). 
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basic indirect strategies were developed to bypass the perceived 
restrictions on federal power. One strategy was designed to provide 
federal funding for big projects the states could not afford.69 The 
Federal government had one asset that was not restricted by the 
constitution- federal land. The federal government could donate 
federal land to the states, states could sell the land, and the proceeds 
could be used for water projects.70 Thus, through indirect means 
states were provided funds for draining swamps,71 building canals, 
72 and for reclamation projects.73  
The second indirect method involved states claiming a 
project benefited navigation when the major impact was actually for 
another purpose. This method became increasingly common as the 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 See generally, DONALD PISANI, WATER, LAND, AND LAW IN THE 
WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC POLICY, 1850-1920 (University of Kansas 
Press, 1996). 
71 See, e.g., Swamp Land Acts of 1849 (9 Stat. 352), 1850 (9 Stat. 
520), and 1860 (12 Stat 3). Over 64,000.000 acres eventually went to states 
under a series of Swampland Acts; See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF 
PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT, at 325 (Public Land Law 
Commission, Wash. D.C., 1968). 
72 GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT, at 325. 
In 1827 and 28 grants were made to Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Alabama. 
73 The Carey Act, 43 Stat. 2610 (1894). This act was largely 
unsuccessful (See Gates, at 650, supra note 73; Pisani, at 104, supra note 
71.) 
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1800s progressed, because of the high rate of success in getting these 
projects funded. Thus, the federal government constructed levees to 
improve navigation even though they also prevented floods, and 
constructed reservoirs to improve navigation by capturing debris, 
even though the reservoirs also prevented floods. Discharging refuse 
into navigable waters was prohibited because it could interfere with 
navigation.74 By the end of the 19th century federal power had been 
extended to tributaries of navigable water bodies and other sources 
affecting a water body’s “navigable capacity.”75 Since western states 
were developing laws allowing streams and rivers to be depleted for 
irrigation, and even sometimes completely dewatered, state 
“irrigation” potentially could conflict with federal “navigation.” 
During this period federal power over water was limited to 
navigation related water issues, but this power was none the less 
substantial. All that was needed was a link to navigation which 
Congress was increasingly willing to find. 
                                                 
74 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 403 (1899). 
75 Id., prevented excavations or filling that would affect the 
navigable capacity of navigable waters; See also United States v. Rio 
Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). 
2019] Borderless Commons 109 
Perhaps the most important “state” water management role 
was in defining water rights. Property rights are generally defined 
by state law, rather than federal law. In the east, water rights were 
considered an attribute of riparian land ownership and were thus 
defined by each individual states’ property law.76 Land owners 
decided how water was used, and conflicts between riparian owners 
were resolved in court as were disputes over land.77 State water 
management agencies did not exist. The riparian rights doctrine did 
not work as a property rights system in the western states and 
territories.78 Water could only be used on adjacent land limiting the 
amount of developable lands and could not be diverted outside a 
watershed.79 Miners needed water for placer operations and often 
had to seek water courses miles from their claims to find it. Irrigators 
had a similar problem; the lands immediately adjacent to a river 
were often not ideal for production, and upland areas required 
extensive irrigation works to supply water. Out of need, a new 
                                                 
76 See O.P. Matthews, supra note 69. 
77 Id. 
78 See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855). 
79 See O.P. Matthews, supra note 69. 
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system of water rights, the appropriation doctrine, evolved.80 The 
appropriation doctrine grants a temporal priority to anyone who 
intentionally diverts water from a watercourse and applies it to a 
beneficial use,81 and land ownership is not required.82  
The end of the 1800s was a crucial turning point in the scale 
of water management. Western states were formalizing a system for 
establishing water rights separate from land ownership.83 The annual 
Rivers and Harbors Acts had dropped the “navigation” justification 
for spending federal funds.84 Levees and dams were authorized for 
flood control, not just navigation.85 A significant change was made 
in 1890 when the annual Rivers and Harbors bill moved from 
funding projects to prohibiting interference with a water body’s 
navigable capacity.86 Bridges, dams, and channel alterations now 
                                                 
80 See Irwin, supra note 79. 
81 See generally O.P. Matthews, supra note 69. 
82 Early California miners operated on public land they did not own. 
They were in fact trespassers. Without ownership they had no riparian 
right; Irwin, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).   
83 See O.P. Matthews, supra note 69. 
84 Rivers and Harbors Act, supra note 75.  
85 River and Harbor Act of 1890 26 Stat. 426 §13 (1890); River and 
Harbor Act of 1892 27 Stat. 88 (1892). 
86 Id. 
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required federal permission.87 The major irrigation projects being 
contemplated during the 1890s would have to comply with this 
federal requirement. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 
reauthorized the 1890 requirement88 and added a permit requirement 
for the discharge of refuse.89 This early environmental statute was a 
substantial assertion of federal power. The integrity of navigable 
waters was being protected not just the water’s “navigable 
capacity.” Discharges into tributaries of navigable water also 
required a permit.90 Before 1900 the federal government had 
asserted strong interests in water. This is the same period that 
western states were developing statutory frameworks for allocating 
water rights.91 These state water rights could not be exercised in 
ways that interfered with the federal requirements. 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 30 Stat. 1121 §10 
(1899). 
89 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 30 Stat. 1121 §13 
(1899). 
90 Id. 
91 See generally, Pisani, supra note 71. 
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2. The Reclamation Act Compromise 
By the time the federal Reclamation Act passed in 1902, the 
appropriation doctrine was well established. State constitutions or 
statutory provisions recognized it,92 and courts had endorsed it.93 
Even so, the appropriation doctrine was a cobbled together system 
designed to solve specific local problems. Not until the Wyoming 
Constitution and water code (enacted in 1890) did comprehensive 
water laws emerge.94 The Wyoming Constitution asserts state 
ownership of all the water within the state’s boundaries.95 Other 
state codes evolved in time with many claiming water “ownership” 
in state’s name or for the “public.” Even though state or public 
ownership was asserted, each code created rules for establishing 
private property rights held by individuals, corporations or local 
                                                 
92 See Article 14 of the California Constitution (adopted in 1879), 
which directed that water be regulated and controlled by the State.  The 
Colorado Constitution, at Article 16, § 5 (1876), declared unappropriated 
water in the State to be the “property of the public.”  
93 Irwin, supra note 79; Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Company 6 Colo. 
443 (1882). 
94 ROBERT E. BECK & OWEN L. ANDERSON, INTRODUCTION AND 
BACKGROUND, 11 Waters and Water Rights § 11.04(b) (2012).  
95 WYO. CONST. art 8, § 1. 
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governments.96 These property rights are “use” (usufructuary) rights 
that can be sold under defined circumstances.97 In spite of the 
substantial interest claimed by states under the state ownership 
doctrine, allowing water to be sold in private transactions makes 
water a commodity. The public’s interest in market transactions was 
nominally protected,98 but this protection had a very low bar capable 
of being passed by any economically beneficial use.99 
The Reclamation Act was a game changer in the 
administration of western water allocation law. States had no 
systematic method for adjudicating water rights creating substantial 
uncertainty within the existing property rights systems. Why should 
                                                 
96 See generally, Pisani, supra note 71. 
97 See Gould, supra note 4. 
98 “Of the 19 member states of the Western Governors Association, 
12 states contain some form of broad statement that approval of a water 
transfer cannot run contrary to the general interest of the citizens of the 
state”; Mike Pease, Water Transfer Laws and Policies: Tough Questions 
and Institutional Reform for the Western United States, 4 [J] NAT. 
RESOURCE POL’Y RES. 103, 112 (2012). 
99 Beneficial use is loosely defined. For example, South Dakota 
defines beneficial use as “reasonable and useful and beneficial to the 
appropriator, and at the same time is consistent with the interests of the 
public of this state” S.D § 46-1-6(3). For a more detailed overview of 
beneficial use, see generally Robert Beck & Owen L. Anderson, 
Elements of Prior Appropriation, 11 Waters and Water Rights §11.01 
(2012). 
114 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
the federal government spend money on large reclamation projects 
when existing water rights were unknown? Fear that speculators 
would claim water rights in areas prior to a federal project led to a 
push to reform state laws.100 Wyoming’s comprehensive approach 
was adopted in some western states while other states adopted the 
Bien Code.101 The Bien Code is a model water allocation code 
developed around 1903 by the federal Reclamation Service. Unclear 
state laws and unadjudicated water rights prompted a more 
systematic approach to water management.102 Before large projects 
were approved or funded, the Reclamation Service encouraged 
states to adopt a comprehensive code. These codes clarified the 
existing systems for establishing water rights and resolving 
conflicts. When the Reclamation Act was eventually passed, 
Congress deferred to these state laws allowing states to control water 
                                                 
100 This was a catalyst for the relation-back doctrine, which attempts 
to clarify expectations for the progression and finalization of a water 
diversion, see generally Coffin, 6 Colo. 443 (1882). 
101 See F.M. PHILLIPS, G.E. HALL, AND M.E. BLACK, REINING IN 
THE RIO GRANDE: PEOPLE LAND, AND WATER, (UNM Press, 2015). 
102 See W.A. Hutchins, J.P. DeBraal & H.H. Ellis, Water Rights 
Laws in the Nineteen Western States, at 458-59 (U.S. DEPT. OF AGR., 
NAT. RESOURCE ECON. DIV., 1974).   
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rights.103 Federal authority over navigation and commerce was 
retained. 
 States were also motivated to adopt comprehensive codes by 
the fear of federal authority over water rights.104 As the owner of the 
public domain, the federal government had a strong claim to water 
“ownership.”105 The federal Irrigation Survey had identified 147 
reservoir sites by 1890,106 poising the federal government to be a 
player in western irrigation. The federal threat to western state’s 
allocation systems could not be ignored, but states required federal 
financial support to develop large irrigation projects.   
The debates leading up to the Reclamation Act of 1902 show 
that there was substantial disagreement over the way federal and 
state roles should be balanced in reclamation projects.107 The 
original bill introduced by westerners gave the states almost 
                                                 
103 See Pisani, supra note 71. 
104 See Pisani, supra note 71, at 64.   
105 See Kansas v. Colorado (1907) where the U.S. intervened and 
made this argument.  Although the Court did not support the federal 
position this was an unknown when the Reclamation Act was being 
negotiated and during its early implementation. 
106 Pisani, supra note 71, at 163. 
107 See Pisani, supra note 71. 
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complete power over projects and rendered the federal role to 
financing.108 This was met with a tepid reception from eastern 
senators and congressmen who wanted a more expansive federal 
role. Subsequent western concessions were insufficient to move 
eastern interests.109 Eastern politicians were reluctant to approve a 
bill that would be costly and of no benefit to their constituents. Only 
President Roosevelt’s veto threat to the pending Rivers and Harbors 
Bill, which largely benefited eastern interests, brought the 
Reclamation Act to a vote.110  
When the Reclamation Act was first passed the federal 
government did not have a system for establishing water rights.111 
States stepped into this void and actively granted water rights in 
1902, even though their systems for doing so were still a bit 
                                                 
108 See generally Pisani, supra note 71; LAWRENCE J. MACDONELL, 
FROM RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABILITY: WATER, AGRICULTURE AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST (1999). 
109 To accomplish this, the Bureau of Reclamation established long-
term contracts with irrigation districts and individual irrigators. Within 
these contracts were long-term pricing agreements for water deliveries 
and repayment schedules for the irrigation works. For a review of the 
success of these projects, see generally Pisani, supra note 71; 
MacDonell, supra note 108. 
110 See Pisani, supra note 71, at 319. 
111 Pisani, supra note 71. 
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chaotic.112 The western congressmen who supported the Act made 
sure that this power remained with the States.113 States could 
establish property rights, but those rights could not interfere with 
other federal powers.114 After being largely silent during the 1800s, 
Congress and the Supreme Court were more willing to recognize an 
expanded federal role.115  
C. Muddying the Federalism Waters 
After the Reclamation Act, the first Supreme Court case 
addressing the federal role in water management was Kansas v. 
Colorado. discussed above. The extreme positions taken by Kansas 
and Colorado threatened the future of federal irrigation projects 
which prompted the federal government to intervene.116 If Kansas’ 
position was upheld the ability to divert water for reclamation 
projects would be destroyed.117 Although the federal government 
                                                 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See ROBERT E. BECK & AMY K. KELLY, THE LEGAL REGIMES, 
Water and Water Rights § 4.02 & 4.03 (2012).  
115 Id. 
116 Douglas L. Grant, Equitable Apportionment Suits Between 
States, § 45.02, in Water and Water Rights (LexisNexis 2012).   
117 Id. 
118 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
liked Colorado’s appropriation doctrine, it did not like Colorado’s  
claim of absolute power over water as it would negatively affect 
interstate commerce.118 
The federal position in Kansas v. Colorado seems a bit 
extreme in light of the specific congressional deference to state 
water allocation law, but the states also had extreme positions. 
Neither state recognized the rights in the other state. Colorado 
attempted to argue full control over its portion of the Arkansas 
River, citing state sovereignty over the watercourse as it passes 
through state territory.119 Kansas took an opposite, yet similarly 
uncompromising position arguing Colorado had no right to disrupt 
the natural flow of the Arkansas River.120 Such extreme positions 
exemplify the protectionist actions that necessitated the commerce 
clause. None of the extreme positions were accepted, but a balance 
between state and federal rights was recognized.   
In the next year, federal power over water was once again 
before the Supreme Court. The Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in 
                                                 
118 Amy K. Kelly, Federal Reclamation Law, § 41.04, in Water and 
Water Rights (LexisNexis 2012).   
119 Supra note 118. 
120 Id. 
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Montana was created by federal action in 1888.121 Over the next 
decade, the tribes used water from the Milk River for irrigation and 
domestic purposes.122 After the federal reservation was created, 
Montana citizens acquired water rights using Montana law on the 
Milk River.123 Because the water supply was insufficient for all 
users, a conflict developed.124 In Winters v. United States125 the 
Court addressed whether the creation of the reservation set aside 
water for tribal use or whether Montana acquired control over water 
by attaining statehood.126  
                                                 





126 Winters v. U. S., 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). The Court stated: 
“The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them 
from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be. 
United States v. The Rio Grande Ditch & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, at 
702; United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371. That the Government did 
reserve them we have decided, and for a use which would be necessarily 
continued through years”  In United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 
(1905), the Court upheld the rights of Tribes to hunting and fishing 
rights, stating, “…the Treaty of 1859, was not a grant of right to the 
Indians, but a reservation by the Indians of rights already possessed and 
not grated away by them.” 
120 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
By 1908, state laws were subservient to federal law if the 
navigable capacity of a stream was harmed or if the federal 
government reserved water.127 Anytime the federal government 
reserves land, a federal water right is created.128 This reserved rights 
doctrine was viewed as an exception under Indian law until it was 
expanded in 1963.129 The federal right supersedes any state right 
created subsequent to the federal reservation.130 The volumetric 
limit of the right is defined by an amount sufficient to accomplish 
the purposes of the federal reservation.131 This reserved rights 
doctrine was viewed as an exception under Indian law until it was 
expanded in 1963.132  
As the federal presence in other aspects of water 
management grew, 133 deference to state laws that established water 
                                                 
127 Gibbons (1870), supra note 61., Id. at 577-78. 
128 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 548 (1963). 
129 Id. 
130 Winters (1908), supra note 121. 
131 Id. at 703-05. 
132 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 548 (1963). 
133 Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or 
abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been established by any 
State. The Clean Water Act of 1977 § 101, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West 
2018). 
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rights were provided in federal statutes. Federal “deference” to state 
law allows individuals to obtain water rights and sell those rights but 
does not capitulate other federal powers over water. Rather, 
deference to a state’s water rights laws is a very limited form of 
deference; the substantial federal presence in water regulation would 
be untenable if such deference gave states the power to veto federal 
laws.134   
The exercise of these federal powers has frequently been 
challenged, but almost always upheld. For example, in U.S. v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 
power to determine ‘waters of the United States’ as laid-out in the 
Clean Water Act was upheld.135 Federal jurisdiction can even extend 
to non-navigable watercourses if a “significant nexus” exists 
between those watercourses and a navigable stream.136   
                                                 
134 Sporhase, supra note 3. 
135 U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 121 
(1985). 
136 Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006) (The case does not 
include as broad a definition of “waters” of the U.S. as some members of 
the Court advocated, but it is not as restrictive as others proposed. The 
nuances of this case are beyond the scope of this article).  
122 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
D.  Congressional Apportionment 
In Kansas v. Colorado, the Supreme Court expressed doubt 
that Congress had power to apportion water in a dispute between 
two states.137 The Court held for federal power over water extended 
to federal lands through the constitution’s property clause, but that 
congressional power “cannot determine the rule which shall control 
between the two states.”138 The Court also refused to enforce the law 
of one state on another, and instead used federal common law 
(equitable apportionment) since there was no other choice to resolve 
the dispute. Federal congressional authority seemed to be limited to 
navigation and instances where there was federal property. This 
decision came at a time of transition in the balance between state 
and federal power. Western states had begun claiming ownership of 
water shortly before this, 139 while at the same time the definition of 
                                                 
137 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907). 
138 Id. at 94. 
139 Most prior appropriation states claim ownership over water, but 
reserve the right for its appropriation by citizens willing to that water to a 
‘beneficial use.’ For example, New Mexico law states, “All natural 
waters flowing in streams and watercourses, whether such be perennial, 
or torrential, within the limits of the state of New Mexico, belong to the 
public and are subject to appropriation for beneficial use.” N.M. Stat. 
Ann. § 72-1-1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 40 of the 1st Regular Session 
of the 54th Legislature (2019)).   
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navigable waters was expanding to include tributaries that were not 
in themselves navigable.140 Through much of the next century, 
federal power under the commerce clause expanded dramatically.141 
The Court was asked to rebalance these competing interests with 
federal power gradually expanding. Congressional power to 
apportion water illustrates this process. 
In 1931, the Court seemed to backtrack on whether Congress 
had power to apportion water.142 Then, in 1963 the Court stated 
unequivocally, “Where Congress has so exercised its constitutional 
power over waters, courts have no power to substitute their own 
notions of an ‘equitable apportionment’ for the apportionment 
chosen by Congress.”143 This was a complete reversal of the position 
taken in 1907. The Court went on to say that in 1928 Congress had 
                                                 
140 State of Or. By and Through Div. of State Lands v. Riverfront 
Protec. Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1982). 
141 Kaiser Aetna v. U. S., 444 U.S. 164, 173 (1979) (Congressional 
power under Commerce Clause is not limited to navigation but includes 
any water that affects interstate commerce); Sporhase, supra 3.  
142 State of Arizona v. State of California, 283 U.S. 423, 458 (1931) 
(“The further claim is that the mere existence of the act will invade quasi 
sovereign rights of Arizona by preventing the state from exercising its 
right to prohibit or permit under its own laws the appropriation of 
unappropriated waters flowing within or on its borders”). 
143 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963). 
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exercised its power and apportioned the lower Colorado River 
between California, Arizona, and Nevada.144 Congress again 
exercised its apportionment power in the Carson-Truckee-Pyramid 
Lake Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990.145 The question then is 
not whether there is substantial congressional power over water, but 
whether there is a constitutional basis for congressional action.   
E.  State v. State 
Much of the background for understanding conflicts 
between states was discussed above. Three basic ways are available 
to resolve disputes: an equitable apportionment with the Supreme 
Court exercising original jurisdiction, a negotiated interstate 
compact between states that is approved by congress, and 
congressional apportionment.146 None of these mechanisms are 
                                                 
144 Boulder Canyon Project Act, §§ 1–21. 
145 Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement 
Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990) (Prior to this act California and 
Nevada had negotiated a compact.  The compact was not approved by 
Congress because it ignored Indian water rights in Pyramid Lake. The 
congressional apportionment was used to resolve the impasse.). 
146 Douglas L. Grant, State Regulation of Inter-state Water Export, 3 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 48.03 (Robert E. Beck and Amy L. 
Kelley, eds., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2009); Douglas L. 
Grant, Interstate Water Allocation, in 3 WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS § 43.02 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 2014). 
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satisfactory strategies for managing interstate water, at least in their 
current form in the western states. Equitable apportionment and 
interstate compacts will be evaluated below. 
F. Equitable Apportionment 
In Kansas v. Colorado, the Supreme Court established the 
equitable apportionment doctrine as federal common law.147 The 
decision did not, however, actually apportion water.148 Kansas could 
not prove that it was being harmed by the irrigation practices in 
Colorado. This result is not uncommon,149 and the Supreme Court 
would prefer states resolve such disputes through a negotiated 
agreement—an interstate compact.150 The Supreme Court has only 
                                                 
147 Kansas, supra note 138. 
148 Id. 
149 See also, Arkansas River--Kansas v. Colorado (1902 Court has 
jurisdiction), (1907 The court chose to not interject as no demonstrable 
harm was proven by Kansas), (1943 The Court determined Kansas is 
incapable of showing redressable harm); Catawba River--South Carolina 
v. North Carolina (2007 & 2010 still pending on the main issues); 
Colorado River--Arizona v. California (1963 The Court ruled the 
equitable apportionment standard does not apply for the ‘lower basin’ of 
the Colorado River because there was a Congressional apportionment); 
Connecticut River--Connecticut v. Mass (1931 Connecticut failed to 
prove harm); Vermejo River--Colorado v. New Mexico (1982 & 1984 
New Mexico lacked proof of harm), Walla Walla River--Washington v 
Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936) WA couldn’t prove diversions to irrigators 
in Oregon materially lessen the quantity of water for use in Washington. 
150 Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 554–55 (1983) (“This Court 
cannot rewrite the Compact so as to provide for a third, tie-breaking vote. 
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apportioned water three times, the last time being in 1945.151 This is 
not because the Court has had no opportunity,152 but because of their 
reluctance to impose a solution on states and the state’s difficulties 
in proving the seriousness and degree of harm.  
In equitable apportionment cases the Supreme Court has 
primary and exclusive jurisdiction.153 Instead of acting as a “trial 
court” and determining the facts of the case, a Special Master is 
appointed to collect evidence and preside over hearings.154 These 
cases are factually difficult and take an enormous amount of time. 
For example, in Kansas v. Colorado the Special Master spent six 
years gathering evidence resulting in 8,559 pages of testimony from 
                                                 
Moreover, the Court's equitable powers have never been exercised so as 
to appoint quasi-administrative officials to control the division of 
interstate waters on a day-to-day basis). 
151 See also, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); New 
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 
U.S. 419 (1922). 
152 Id. 
153 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.2. 
154 Douglas L. Grant, State Regulation of Inter-state Water Export, 
supra note 147. 
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347 witnesses.155 There were also 122 exhibits.156 More recent cases 
have taken even longer and are even more complex with “dueling 
experts.” At the conclusion the court-appointed “Special Master” 
files a report with the Supreme Court, but the Court is not bound by 
its recommendations.157 Although they give deference to the report, 
modifications are possible. In Colorado v. New Mexico, the Masters’ 
recommendation to give Colorado a share of the Vermejo River was 
rejected twice.158    
The equitable apportionment process has many problems. A 
decision is not final since equities can change. In fact, in the first 
dispute the Court encouraged Kansas to seek redress if the equities 
changed as a result of Colorado increasing water use.159 For 
example, Kansas sued Colorado again over the Arkansas River but 
once again failed to prove that Colorado was causing them 
                                                 
155 James Earl Sherow, Watering the Valley: Development along the 
High Plains Arkansas River, 1870-1950 105-06 (1990). 
156Id.; Marguerite Chapman, Where East Meets West in Water Law: 
The Formulation of an Interstate Compact to Address the Diverse 
Problems of the Red River Basin, 38 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 33 n.195 (1985). 
157 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984). 
158 Id. 
159 Kansas, 206 U.S. at 117. 
128 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
“substantial harm.”160 The apportionment on the North Platte and 
the Delaware River were also re-litigated and modified.161 
Another problem is the uncertain outcome that faces states 
when they begin this process. Uncertainty stems from several 
sources. The factors used in making an equitable apportionment are 
open ended. The weighing of each variable is unknown. In addition, 
the harm done must be of “serious magnitude” that is “clearly and 
convincingly proven.” What constitutes a “serious magnitude” for 
Kansas may not be viewed similarly by the Supreme Court.   
The last major issue is the Court’s inability to have a 
continuing role in river management and their lack of technical 
expertise to even participate. The decisions occur at a point in time 
based on current circumstances. This means the solutions have to be 
simple from an administrative perspective. In Wyoming v. Colorado, 
on the Laramie River the principle of prior appropriation was used 
but the boundary was not erased because that would require a federal 
                                                 
160 320 U.S. at 385. 
161 Grant, infra note 147. 
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water master to administer the priorities.162 In Wyoming v. 
Nebraska, a percentage of the rivers flow was allocated because it 
was simple to administer. In the Delaware River dispute a River 
master appointed but the role there was strictly technical.163 The 
Court itself admits it does not have the technical expertise for 
continuing management that is required for complex river 
systems.164  
G. Interstate Compacts 
Interstate compacts are negotiated between interested States 
and ratified by Congress, making them federal law.165 Twenty-two 
                                                 
162 Grant, State Regulation of Inter-state Water, supra note 147; 
Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation, in 3 WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS § 45.07 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 2014). 
163 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (also appointed a 
River Master on the Pecos River. This was not an equitable 
apportionment case but one involving an interstate compact as will be 
discussed below). 
164 Grant, State Regulation of Inter-state Water, supra note 147; 
Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation, in 3 WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS § 46.05 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 2014). 
165 Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 386 (2011) (held that the 
Delaware River Basin Commission was founded via the Delaware River 
Compact P.L. 87-238 (1961). The signatory states, New York, New 
Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania agreed to conjunctively manage 
issues of flood control and water supply. The Susquehanna River Basin 
Compact P. L. 91-575 (1970) was created to introduce cooperation and 
comprehensive planning between the signatory states, Pennsylvania, 
New York, and Maryland.). 
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water compacts have been approved in the West, with the first 
compacts being drafted and approved in the 1920s.166 As compacts 
require states to reach an agreement they frequently have severe 
limitations that hinder water management.167 Even after compacts 
are enacted their interpretation is frequently the subject of 
litigation.168 Three major problems occur with these western 
allocation compacts: 1) limited scope of the compacts; 2) lack of 
clarity in the allocation process and method; and 3) failure to include 
a continuing administrative process and structure.169 
                                                 
166 Boulder Canyon Project Act, §§ 1–21, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 617–617t; 
Act Aug. 19, 1921, 42 Stat. 171 
167 See generally, Zachary L. McCormick, Interstate Water 
Allocation Compacts in the Western United States—Some Suggestions, 
30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 385 (1995). Zackary L. McCormick, The 
Use of Interstate Compacts to Resolve Transboundary Water Allocation 
Issues, Doctoral Dissertation, Oklahoma State University (1994). 
168 These include (river basin included in parentheses); Oklahoma 
and Texas v. NM (Canadian), Tex v. NM (Rio Grande), Kansas v. Col 
(Arkansas), Kansas v. Neb., Mont. V. Wyo (Yellowstone).  In addition 
other suits have been brought by private parties for example, Hinderlider 
vs. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Company 304 U.S. 92 (1938), 
and Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann D.C. No. 5:07-CV-
00045-HE No. 10-6184 (2011).  See generally HALL, G. E. 2002, HIGH 
AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE FOR THE 
PECOS RIVER, UNM Press, pp. 291., and Douglas L. Grant, Interstate 
Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence Becomes 
the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.105 (2003). 
169 McCormick (1995) supra note 168.  McCormick uses four 
categories including “nonunanimous vote” and “dispute resolution”.  
These are included under continuing administrative process and 
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Western water compacts are limited in scope and focus 
almost exclusively on the allocation of surface waters. In fact, 
western water compacts prevent comprehensive watershed 
management.170 They are inefficient in resolving problems that arise 
subsequent to compact negotiation due to a limited purpose and rigid 
structure. For example, ignoring groundwater hydrologically 
connected to the compact river has caused many problems.171 Only 
one compact expressly includes groundwater in its 
apportionment,172 while another specifically excludes it.173 Two 
                                                 
structure.  This term is used to match that used in the seminal article on 
compacts. See also Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The compact 
Clause of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE 
L.J. 685 (1925).  The authors thought compacts had an advantage over 
litigation because they resulted from a “sensible compromise” and would 
provide for a “continuing administration”.  See generally Grant supra 
note 165.   At the time the Frankfurter and Landis article was written not 
many compacts had been completed.  The benefits they saw did not in 
fact materialize.  
170 Howe, supra note 13.  
171 For example, on the Pecos River groundwater pumping caused a 
depletion in surface water supplies, leading to a shortfall in New Mexico’s 
water delivery to Texas. See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983).  
A similar situation occurred on the Arkansas River. See Kansas v. 
Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995) and Alamosa La Jara etc v.  Gould 674 
P2d 914 Colo. (1983). 
172 Amended Bear River Compact 1980.  See generally Grant supra 
note 165. 
173 Klamath River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 85-222, § 1 (1957). 
132 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
others recognize that groundwater pumping may impact the surface 
water apportionment.174 By implication, groundwater has been 
included by subsequent litigation when surface water flows failed to 
meet downstream surface delivery obligations.175 Early water 
allocation compacts also ignore the connection between water 
quantity and water quality.176 Reducing the volume of flowing water 
can have a direct impact on water quality.177 Most allocation 
compacts also exclude federal interests. Specifically, these include 
reserved water rights, which were mostly unquantified when 
                                                 
174 Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, Pub. L. No. 92-308, 
(1972), and Upper Niobrara River Compact, Pub. L. No. 83-191, ____ 
(1953). 
175 In Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987), the Court required 
New Mexico to curtail ground water pumping to improve downstream 
flows. 
176 The Red River Compact specifically includes pollution as one of 
its principal purposes as well as flood control.  See Pub. L. No. 96-564, 
94 Stat. 3305 (1980). Beck lists others. NEED TO INCLUDE purposes 
of flood control.  
177 Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. 
Colo 1983). 
2019] Borderless Commons 133 
compacts were negotiated.178 Failure to include federal interests can 
lead to a rejection of the compact.179   
Allocation methods that seem like a “sensible compromise” 
when negotiated often turn out to be controversial and challenging 
to interpret leading to litigation.180 Allocation methods are generally 
based on storage (limiting the amount of water stored by the 
upstream state), flow (dividing the water flowing in a river), or a 
method designed to fit particular circumstances.181 The critical 
                                                 
178 For example, the reserved rights of five tribes within the 
Colorado River basin were not quantified until 1963. In U.S. v. New 
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), the Court expanded federal reserved rights 
by recognizing federally reserved rights on U.S. Forest Service lands to 
secure favorable streamflows and for timber production. 
179 President Roosevelt vetoed the Republican River Compact in 
1942 because the compact negotiation committee lacked federal 
representation. Congress did not ratify the California-Nevada Interstate 
Compact Commission’s agreement. The agreement was ratified by both 
states in 1971; the two states then executed the agreement without the 
backing of the federal government. Edella Schlager and Yanya Heikkila, 
Strengthening Cross-State Linkages to Improve Watershed Governance: 
The Case of Western Interstate River Compacts, Published Abstract, 
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, (2007). 
180 For example, there is ongoing litigation between Texas and New 
Mexico concerning the Pecos River Compact, Texas v. New Mexico, 482 
U.S. 124 (1987).  A lack of quantification of water rights between Lower 
Basin states led to litigation under the Colorado River Compact in 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).  See generally, Felix 
Frankfurter & James Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution — 
A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L. J. 685, 749–54 (1928).  
181 McCormick supra note 168. See also Grant, supra note 165; 
although Grant states this slightly differently: “[C]ompacts must either 
134 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
factor in understanding the impact of a particular method is 
determining whether the upstream or downstream state will assume 
the risk in a time of shortage. A storage allocation limits the size of 
the upstream state’s reservoirs.182 This method seems like a 
reasonably simple solution with the downstream state receiving only 
the surplus above the storage allowance. The downstream state in 
this instance assumes the risk that there will be a surplus.   
Flows are allocated by three methods: percentage of flow, 
use of models, and guaranteed quantities.183 As mentioned 
previously, the percentage of flow was used by the Supreme Court 
in its equitable apportionment of the North Platte.184 With this 
allocation method, states must agree on the percentage allocation 
each state will receive and the point or points where to take 
measurements. Risk of shortage is shared based on the percentage 
                                                 
(1) limit how much water the upper state can use or (2) guarantee the 
lower state a certain amount of water.” 
182 Canadian River Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-345, Art.2(d) (1946).  
The Canadian River Compact was flawed because it referred to water 
“originating” above a specific point on the Canadian River. The meaning 
of “originating” was debated in Oklahoma and Texas v. New Mexico 501 
U.S. 221 (1991).   
183 McCormick (1995) supra note 168.  
184 Supra note 150. 
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allocation. Models can also be used as a means of sharing the risk 
between two states. Models are based on scientific studies designed 
to give a more rigorous description of a river’s hydrologic 
conditions.185 For example, in the Rio Grande Compact, flowing 
water is measured at specific upstream points, and a schedule of 
delivery is used to determine how much water must be delivered at 
downstream locations.186 The Pecos River Compact was based on a 
scientific study designed to reflect the river’s status as of 1947.187 
Unfortunately, the science proved incorrect, which lead to 
litigation.188 Flow can also be allocated by upstream state or states 
guaranteeing delivery of a specified quantity. If a shortage in flow 
occurs the upstream states assume the risk and must deliver the 
specified volume. Thus, on the Colorado River the upper basin states 
have guaranteed to deliver a volume of water to the lower basin 
                                                 
185 McCormick (1995) supra note 168. 
186 Rio Grande Compact, Pub. L. No. 76-96, Art III. (1938).   
187 Pecos River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81-89, Art II (1948). 
188 Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987). 
136 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
states.189 The guaranteed delivery was based on average flows of the 
River that were substantially inflated.190   
Compacts must be approved by the legislature of each state 
involved in the negotiation. Approval is a political decision focused 
on protecting existing rights rather than a water management 
decision. Although water managers may feel the best way to manage 
a watershed is through a comprehensive and flexible system 
incorporating an entire watershed, compacts are based on state 
protectionism. If they were not, the politicians would never approve 
of them. This leads to very weak administrative processes and 
structures that make responding to change very difficult. Three 
significant faults occur: 1) ineffective compact commissions; 2) 
ineffective dispute resolution; and 3) state insistence in retaining 
authority over water rights. 
Compact commissions are the administrative structure for 
interstate compacts. Unfortunately, only two-thirds of the compacts 
                                                 
189 Colorado River Compact Pub. L. No. 67-56, Art. III. (1928). 
190 Jason A. Robison and Douglas S. Kenney. Equity and the 
Colorado River Compact. 42 ENVTL LAW 1157 (2012).  
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have a commission.191 Even if there is a commission, there may not 
be any permanent staff or budget supporting it. Frequently the 
commission’s authority is limited to data gathering, but these may 
not be binding on a court if litigation occurs.192 Only a few compacts 
authorize enforcement.193 Changes or amendments to compacts are 
beyond the commission’s power.   
If a dispute occurs, there may not be any internal mechanism 
for resolving it. One evaluation shows that over half the western 
interstate compacts have no specified dispute resolution 
mechanism.194 This means each state has a right to veto any decision 
forcing the dispute into litigation. In three compacts with more than 
two states, a supermajority would allow one state to vote in the 
negative and still gain approval.195 Each state is given two votes but 
                                                 
191 Douglas Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts, in Water and 
Water Rights, §46.03 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991).  See generally, Jerome 
C. Muys, Interstate Water Compacts: The Interstate Compact and 
Federal-Interstate Compact. (National Water Commission, Legal Study 
No.14, 1971). 
192 Douglas Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts, in Water and 
Water Rights, §46.03 at note 87. (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991).  
193 Douglas Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts, in Water and 
Water Rights, §46.03 at note 88 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991).  
194 McCormick (1995) supra note 168, at Table 1. 
195 McCormick (1995) supra note 168, at Table 1. 
138 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
requires three votes to make a decision (as long as a state’s 
commission votes together they have a veto). Arbitration is possible 
in three states, but it is not mandatory in two of them, which provides 
a unilateral veto. In one state an ad hoc committee may be appointed, 
but any decision requires legislative ratification. Two compacts 
allow the federal representative to break a tie vote, but it is unlikely 
the federal government would ever exercise this responsibility over 
anything significant.196   
Most compacts make it clear states want to retain authority 
over water rights. Compacts typically include language like that in 
the Red River Compact.197 This means new appropriations or 
transfers of existing rights must comply with the water law of the 
                                                 
196 Supra note 168. Of the 22 compacts, only one has mandatory 
arbitration, three allow supermajorities to prevail, and the remainder, in 
essence, give a single state a veto. Compacts were designed to be 
ineffective and maintain the status quo. There is nothing flexible about 
them. With changing populations, increasing water demand, and 
uncertain water supplies, this inflexibility undermines the benefits of 
compacts. 
197 Red River Compact Pub. L. No. 96-564, (1980). Section 2.10 
provides that “[n]othing in the Compact shall be deemed to: (a) interfere 
with or impair the right or power of any signatory State to regulate 
within its boundaries the appropriation, use and control of water or 
quality of water.…”   
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state of origin. This language is virtually identical to the boilerplate 
language in the Reclamation Act and the Federal Power Act.   
Congress generally does not play a substantive role in the 
negotiations of these compacts, and most western allocation 
compacts exclude federal interests. If the federal government is not 
a party to the compact, it is difficult to believe Congress consents to 
a burden on interstate commerce without making this intention 
explicitly clear.198   
III.  BORDERLESS COMMONS 
 A critical aspect of the U.S. federal system is the limitations 
placed on state sovereignty by the constitution.199 These state 
limitations were recognized in Gibbons v. Ogden.200 Striking a 
balance between federal and state power over commerce has never 
been an easy task, with debate harking back to the first 
                                                 
198 There is a compelling argument that states can unilaterally 
withdraw from a compact. See Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water 
Allocation Compacts: When The Virtue Of Permanence Becomes The 
Vice Of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105 (2003). If this is true, can 
the federal government be held accountable? 
199 See Richard Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a 
Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of 
Constitutional Structure, 31 Wayne St. L. Rev. 885 (1985). 
200 Supra note 62. In Gibbons the Supreme Court upheld the federal 
power to regulate navigation under the commerce clause. 
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Constitutional Congress. The Commerce Clause affirmatively 
grants the federal government power over commerce. At the same 
time, states using their police powers can regulate commerce. 
Drawing the line between the acceptable exercise of state power and 
an infringement on federal interests continues as a contentious 
issue.201 These limitations, sometimes called the dormant or 
negative Commerce Clause, are not accepted by all legal scholars,202 
and one Supreme Court justice finds no constitutional support for 
them.203 Strong arguments have been made refuting this position,204 
                                                 
201 See generally Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and 
the Myth of Dual Federalism, 54 UCLA Law Review 94 (2007); Barry 
Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 
67 U. Chic. Law R. 1089 (2000); Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce 
Clause: Federalism in Progressive Political Theory and the Commerce 
Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 403 (2002). 
202E.g. Eule, Julian N.  Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to 
Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425 (1982); Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormant 
Commerce Clause out of its Misery, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1745 (1991); Amy 
M. Petragnani, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On its Last Leg, 7 Alb. 
L. Rev. 1215 (1994).   
203 Justice Thomas does not recognize the dormant or negative 
commerce clause. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of 
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997); American Trucking Association v. 
Michigan, 545 U.S. 429 (2005); Hillside Dairy etc. v. Lyons etc.  539 U.S. 
59 (2003). Justice Scalia has also questioned the validity of a dormant or 
negative commerce clause. 
204 E.g. Denning, Brandon P. Confederation-Era Discrimination 
Against Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 94 Ky. L. Rev. 37 (2005). 
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and it is commonly recognized that this provision creates a U.S. 
common market—a form of borderless commons.205 
A. The Commerce Clause –Prohibiting States from 
Discrimination 
The standard used for determining the constitutionality of 
state laws has evolved. During the 1800s states had authority to 
regulate commerce using their inherent police powers unless the 
regulation infringed upon national interests; statutes were 
challenged using a local versus national comparison 206 and tried to 
distinguish whether commerce was intrastate or interstate207 or 
                                                 
205 H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond., 336 U.S. 525 (1949).  See 
also, Williams, Norman R. and Brannon P. Denning, The “New 
Protectionism” and the American Common Market, 85 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 247 (2009); Konar-Steenberg, Mehmet K, One Nation or One 
Market? Liberals, Conservatives and the Misunderstanding of H.P. Hood 
& Sons v. DuMond., 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 957 (2009); Schragger, Richard 
C. Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 
Va. L. Rev. 1091 (2008); Williams Norman R., The Foundation of the 
American Common Market, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 409 (2008); Denning, 
Brandon P. (2005) Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate 
Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 Ky. 
L. Rev. 37 (2006). 
206 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851); Henderson v. 
NY, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); Wabash etc. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). 
207 The Delaware Railroad Tax, 85 U.S.C. § 206 (1874); W. Union 
Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1881); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 
(1888); Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890). 
142 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
whether the impact was a direct or indirect impact on commerce.208 
Import bans were a common problem and were routinely struck 
down.209 After Guy v. Baltimore, a case over fees imposed on vessels 
from other states for the use of public wharves, discrimination 
claims were sufficient for invalidating state legislation. 210 Even state 
statutes not facially discriminatory, but which result in a 
discriminatory impact, were struck down.211 Import and export bans 
were particularly hard to justify because of the inherent 
discrimination in such bans.212  
The Supreme Court has used a variety of “tests” to nullify 
discriminatory state statutes. If the statute is “facially 
discriminatory” a two-part test is used to scrutinize state statutes 
strictly.213 They are upheld only if: 1) a legitimate local interest 
exists that is unrelated to the state’s economic well-being, and 2) 
                                                 
208 Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 
(1878); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894); Diamond Glue Co. v. 
U.S. Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611, 616 (1903). 
209 Railroad Co. v. Husen 95 U.S. 465 (1877); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 
U.S. 100 (1890); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898). 
210 Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1897). 
211 Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890). 
212 See note 196. 
213 Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
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nondiscriminatory alternatives do not exist.214 Few statutes survive 
this strict scrutiny, but one notable exception exists.215 For state 
statutes that are not facially discriminatory but still have a 
discriminatory impact, a balancing test is necessary.216 
“Evenhanded,” “legitimate” local purposes must be balanced 
against “excessive” impacts which burden interstate commerce.217 
For this to be applicable, the statute must apply to an article of 
commerce.218 Natural resources commonly sold in across state lines 
make this determination relatively straightforward. For example, an 
Oklahoma ban on exporting natural gas was unconstitutional,219 as 
was a West Virginia statute granting its citizens preference in 
purchasing natural gas.220   
                                                 
214 Sporhase, supra note 24. 
215 In Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) the court allowed 
clearly protectionist legislation precluding imports to stand because of 
the unknown parasitic threats posed by imported baitfish. 
216 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); See Southern 
Pacific. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) for an early use of a 
balancing approach. 
217 Sporhase (1982), supra, note 24. 
218 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (Is 
garbage an article of commerce?); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 
(1979)(minnows); Sporhase (1982), supra, note 26 (water). 
219 West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).  
220 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).  
144 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
Federal courts have also specifically addressed water as a 
tradable commodity. In Altus v. Carr, a federal district court found 
Texas an anti-export statute invalid.221 Although the Supreme Court 
did not necessarily adopt the reasoning of the District Court decision 
in Altus v. Carr when it summarily affirmed it,222 they did so in 
Sporhase discussed below.223 At issue in Altus v. Carr was a Texas 
statute prohibiting groundwater export unless approved by the Texas 
legislature.224 Part of Texas’ argument was that groundwater was not 
an article of commerce. However, in Texas, groundwater is the 
personal property of the overlying landowners who are free to sell 
what they pump.225 The ability to sell that water makes it an article 
of commerce, making the Texas statute an impermissible burden on 
commerce.    
Three questions were answered in Sporehase: 1) Is 
groundwater an article of commerce?; 2) Does the Nebraska statute 
                                                 
221 Altus v. Carr, 255 F.Supp. 828 (WD Tex) summarily aff’d, 385 
U.S. 35 (1966). 
222 Id.  
223 Sporhase, supra, note 24. 
224 Supra note 224 at 830.  
225 Id at 833. 
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impose an impermissible burden on commerce?; and 3) Has 
Congress consented to what would otherwise be an unconstitutional 
statute?226 In Nebraska, landowners did not own groundwater as 
landowners did in Texas since Nebraska claimed groundwater 
ownership.227 However, groundwater transfers (sales) were allowed 
between users within the state.228 The Court concluded state 
ownership was a ‘legal fiction’ and groundwater was an article of 
commerce. Dismissing this as a groundwater case ignores the 
similarities to state surface water laws. Western states allow the 
transfer and sale of surface waters under a defined set of 
administrative or statutory criteria.229 These statutes cannot impose 
discriminatory burdens against out of state interests as they are 
subject to the provisions outlined under the Commerce Clause.230  
 In answering the second question, the Court applied the test 
from Pike v. Bruce Church.231 If a state statute, “regulates 
                                                 
226 Sporhase, supra, note 24. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 See generally, Pease, supra note 99. 
230 Sporhase at 954 citing Pike at 142. 
231 Id. 
146 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its 
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive 
in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose 
is found, then the question becomes one of degree”.232 The Court 
agreed Nebraska’s public interest in the conservation and 
preservation of ever increasingly scarce water resources was a 
legitimate local purpose. However, the statute contained a facially 
discriminatory reciprocity provision that would only allow 
exportation of groundwater to states that did not ban exports.233 In 
this case, Colorado prohibited groundwater exports. Applications 
made in Nebraska to export water to Colorado would be denied  
Facially discriminatory legislation can be upheld if one of 
two exceptions is found. First, if there is a state interest exception, 
which was not directly considered in Sporhase.234 By finding the 
                                                 
232 Sporhase, supra note 26 at 942. 
233 Id. 
234 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 US 794 (1976); Hicklin 
v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 
(1980); White v. Mass. Council for Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 
204 (1983);South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 
U.S. 82 (1984). 
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state ownership doctrine a legal fiction, this exception is not viable. 
The second exception is congressional consent235; Nebraska argued 
language in 37 federal statutes and interstate compacts deferring to 
state law represents congressional consent.236   
Congressional consent to construct burdens on commerce is 
not easily obtainable. Congressional consent must be “expressly 
stated”237 and an “unambiguous statement.”238 Congressional intent 
must be “unmistakably clear.”239 Congress must “affirmatively 
                                                 
235 Sporhase, supra note 24. New Eng. Power Co. v. New 
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982); South-Central Timber Development, 
Inc. v. Wunnicke, Id; Maine v. Taylor; Northeast Bancorp v. Federal 
Reserve, 472 U.S. 159 (1985); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 
(1992). 
236 The Reclamation Act is typical of such language. In Sporhase, the 
Court said “[s]uch language mandates that questions of water rights that 
arise in relation to a federal project are to be determined in accordance 
with state law.” (at 959 emphasis added).  State laws controlling water 
rights were already in place when these statutes were passed, and Congress 
chose not to create a duplicative federal system.  This is the extent of 
federal deference. “Although the 37 statutes and interstate compacts 
demonstrate Congress’ deference to state water law, they do not indicate 
Congress wished to remove federal constitutional constraints on such state 
laws. The negative implications of the Commerce Clause, like the 
mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, are ingredients of the valid state 
law to which Congress has deferred.” (at 959-60). 
237 Sporhase, supra note 26, at 959, New England Power Company 
v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982). 
238 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).  
239 South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
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contemplate” before it consents to state provisions burdening 
interstate commerce.240 Therefore, boilerplate language deferring to 
state law does not meet this stiff requirement.241   
IV. TARRANT V. OKLAHOMA 
A. Red River Compact 
Negotiations over the Red River Compact (Compact) began 
in the 1940s242 and were delayed because of the influence of 
droughts, concerns for water quality, and disagreements over water 
allocation and storage.243 The complex history of negotiations and 
lack of water storage in downstream states, such as Louisiana, 
contributed to one of the more complicated allocation schemes 
found in an interstate compact. 
The Compact goes into considerable detail allocating water 
to the signatory States.244 Articles IV-VIII divide the River basin 
                                                 
240 Id. 
241 Olen P. Matthews, & Michael Pease, The Commerce Clause, 
Interstate Compacts, and Marketing Water Across State Boundaries, 46 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 601 (2006) at 628.  
242 Zackary L. McCormick, The Use of Interstate Compacts to 
resolve Transboundary Water allocation Issues, Doctoral Dissertation, 
Oklahoma State University (1994) at 213. 
243 Id. at 214.  
244 Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980). 
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into five river-reaches, and many of these reaches divide into 
subbasins. Articles IV-VIII apportion water using both total volume 
and percentage-based allocations.245 At issue in Tarrant is Article 
V, addressing the allocation of water between Oklahoma and Texas 
– defined as, Reach II.246 Section 5.05 states the “Signatory States 
shall have equal rights to the use of runoff originating in subbasin 
5”(emphasis added)--assuming specific instream flow requirements 
are met.247   
Section 5.05 is unique among interstate compacts in relation 
to allocations of ‘runoff,’ which is a term of art within hydrology. 
The term refers to “all water transported out of the watershed by 
streams. Some of this water may have had its origins as overland 
flow, while much may have originally infiltrated and traveled 
through the soil mantel as interflow.”248 After a precipitation event, 
water moves as overland flow and subsurface flow towards rivers 
                                                 
245 Id at Art. IV-VIII. 
246 Id at Art. V. 
247 Id. at §5.05.  Subbasin 5 is a watershed within Reach II as 
defined in the Compact. 
248 WARD, A.D. AND STANLEY W. TRIMBLE, 
ENVIRONMENTAL HYDROLOGY 2d. (2004) at 119. 
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and streams within a watershed. Runoff is generally measured at a 
specific point downstream where the cumulative effect of all 
flowing water can be measured, and includes every part of the 
watershed.249 The Compact states the runoff originating in subbasin 
five is to be equally shared.250 In determining allocations of water 
among the signatory states, Oklahoma argued “runoff” in this 
portion of the Red River should be interpreted to include only the 
disconnected tributaries originating within Texas.251  This runs 
contrary to the way runoff is measured and seems to be a denial of 
the science associated with the hydrologic cycle as tributaries affect 
streamflow downstream.  
B. Tarrant’s Attempt to Transfer 
In the early 2000’s, in an attempt to keep pace with rising 
water demand within its district, Tarrant attempted to purchase 
water from a variety of entities including parties in Oklahoma and 
                                                 
249 For example, the United States Geological Survey measures 
water in the Kiamichi River in a series of gages. 
250 The Signatory States shall have equal rights to the use of runoff 
originating in subbasin 5 and undesignated water flowing into subbasin 
5”, Red River Compact, supra note 248 at §5.05. 
251 Tarrant, supra note 10 at 627.  
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the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations.252 In addition to these 
pursuits, Tarrant endeavored to appropriate water from the Kiamichi 
River and Beaver Creek – tributaries of the Red River in Oklahoma. 
Tarrant chose the Kiamichi because of its lower salinity levels, 
claiming other tributaries in the basin are not fit for cost-effectively 
extracting potable water.253   
In 2007, Tarrant applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources 
Board (OWRB) for a total of 310,000 acre-feet annually.254 
Concurrently, Tarrant filed a motion in Federal District Court 
seeking to enjoin the OWRB from applying Oklahoma’s strict 
requirements for out of state applicants.255 Tarrant could never meet 
these requirements because they were intentionally designed to 
prevent water exports. Tarrant claimed the Compact pre-empted 
Oklahoma’s statutes since there was water within Oklahoma in 
                                                 
252 Tarrant (2013), supra note 10. 
253 Brief of Petitioners Tarrant Regional Water District to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, No.11-889 (2013). The Kiamichi 
River is a moderate sized watercourse flowing through largely forested 
lands. Because of its rural nature, and the predominate landcover, it 
contains unappropriated water as it flows through Oklahoma.    
254 Id. 
255 Tarrant, supra note 10 at 621. 
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excess of that allocated to them by the compact.256 This 
“unallocated” water should be available to Texas. Also, Tarrant had 
a right to cross the border to obtain the water. This claim is 
unprecedented and presumably would be exercised without regard 
to Oklahoma law. 
New appropriations and transfers of existing rights must 
comply with state water law. Since Sporhase, western states have 
passed specific provisions setting the rules for out-of-state 
appropriations.257 But, Section 2.01 of the Compact noted each 
signatory State is allowed to use the water allocated to it “in any 
manner deemed beneficial by that state.”258 From Oklahoma’s 
perspective, this created a separate class of water—one over which 
the state has complete control and is outside the limits of the 
Commerce Clause.259 Tarrant argued the state, as part of its 
allocation process, can define beneficial use, but may not 
                                                 
256 Tarrant, supra note 10 at 627. 
257 These rules must comply with the constitutional limitations on 
state sovereignty implicit in the commerce clause.   
258 Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980) at 
§2.01. 
259 Supra note 246.  
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discriminate against out-of-state interests; defining “beneficial use” 
requires the same criteria be applied whether the use is in-state or 
out-of-state. This would not be the first time water rights have been 
enforced across a state boundary.260  
Also at issue was the question of whether the twenty-five 
percent allocation cap found in Section 5.05 represents an 
“absolute” provision to a signatory state or an initial allocation of 
water.261 If this is an absolute provision of water, as Oklahoma 
argued, the Commerce Clause would not apply and Oklahoma could 
exclusively control the water. If the allocation cap represents an 
initial allocation of water, then the Commerce Clause applies. 
Unappropriated water should be available for appropriation by out-
of-state parties under Oklahoma statutes. These statutes must pass 
constitutional muster.262 In addition, compact water that is already 
appropriated for beneficial use within Oklahoma should be available 
for transfers out-of-state. Any appropriation under Oklahoma 
                                                 
260 Weiland v. Pioneer Irrigation Co., 259 U.S. 498 (1922). 
261 Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980) at 
§5.05. 
262 O.K. STAT §82-105.9-§82-105.11. 
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statutes creates a perfected water right for which market 
reallocations can occur between willing parties to balance supply 
and demand.263 Assuming they apply these waters to a beneficial 
use, these waters should be available to a party such as Tarrant.264 
In looking at Tarrant’s attempts to obtain water, several 
different types of water are potentially available. Unappropriated 
non-compact water should be available for an out-of-state user. An 
out-of-state user should be able to purchase (transfer) a perfected 
water right if the right is to non-compact water. If water is covered 
by the compact, it should also be available for appropriation or 
transfer; unless the Compact exempts this water from the Commerce 
Clause. Although all these types of water were on the table for 
Tarrant, they chose another variety “unallocated” compact water 
available to them without regard to Oklahoma law. To put this in 
perspective, an additional discussion of the Commerce Clause is 
required.        
                                                 
263 For a more expansive discussion of this issue, see Grant, D. L, 
Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence 
becomes the vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 105 (2003). 
264 O.K. STAT §82-105.2 “Beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure and the limit of the right to the use of water….” 
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The constitutionality of Oklahoma’s water appropriation 
statutes hinges on their intent. The Commerce Clause creates a 
common market within the U.S.265 Moving water, be it in raw form 
or embedded in finished products,266 across a state boundary is part 
of that national market. The Commerce Clause precludes states from 
imposing “regulations that place an undue burden on interstate 
commerce.”267 In Hughes v. Oklahoma, the court ruled state statutes 
regulating interstate trade must do so evenhandedly and without 
discrimination.268 This precedent was substantiated in Sporhase.269 
The Supreme Court ruled that because water is an article of 
commerce Nebraska’s statutes imposing restrictions on export were 
unconstitutional. In City of El Paso v. Reynolds,270 a federal district 
court struck down New Mexico’s water export statute, ruling states 
could only discriminate “to the extent that water is essential to 
                                                 
265 Supra note 203. 
266 Sporhase, supra 24. 
267 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579 (1995). 
268 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) at 331. 
269 Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
270 City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983). 
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human survival. Outside of fulfilling human survival needs water is 
an economic resource.”271  
Tarrant argued Oklahoma’s statutes should be declared 
unconstitutional because they impose unfair restrictions on 
interstate transfers. For example, the statutes  
“1) Require legislative approval for out-of-state 
uses but not in-state uses;272 2) Prohibit the 
Oklahoma Water Conservation Storage 
Commission from granting permits for the sale or 
resale of water outside the state;273 3) Put 
additional requirements on water to be exported 
that are not placed on in-state uses;274 and 4) 
Require that long term water appropriations, such 
as those needed for municipal development, 
promote “optimal beneficial use of water” within 
Oklahoma275.”276 
 
Sporhase is the controlling precedent.277 Oklahoma’s 
limitations on water exports are protectionist. The questions at hand 
                                                 
271 City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. at 389 (D.N.M 1983). 
272 Okla. Stat. tit. 82 § 105.12A(D);§ 1085.2(2);§ 1324.10(B). 
273 Okla. Stat. tit. 82 § 1085.22. 
274 Stat. tit. 82 §105.12(F); §105.12A(B); § 105.12(A)(5). 
275 Okla. Stat. tit. 82 § 105.12(F). 
276 Brief of Olen Paul Matthews and Michael Pease as AMICI 
CURIAE, Tarrant Regional Water District v Herrmann. No. 11-889 
(2013). 
277 Sporhase v. Nebraska, supra note 24. 
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are whether 1) Tarrant properly obtained perfected water rights or 
properly appropriated unappropriated water in Oklahoma making 
the case “ripe” for evaluating these statutes, 2) the Compact grants 
congressional consent to an infringement on the national free 
market, 3) the Compact left “unallocated” water within Oklahoma’s 
boundaries and Tarrant was entitled to it.278 The courts at various 
stages determined there were no perfected rights that were ripe.279 
Congress had consented to an otherwise unconstitutional 
infringement on commerce, and the Compact left no water 
“unallocated.”280  
C. The Lower Court Decisions 
After a complex case history, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit reviewed the Western District of Oklahoma’s 
decision in 2011 preventing Tarrant from appropriating water.281 
The District Court granted summary judgment to OWRB finding 
that the “Red River Compact insulates Oklahoma water statutes 
                                                 
278 Supra note 15, at 639. 
279 Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222, 1236 
(10th Cir. 2011), at 4; Supra note, 15 at 638. 
280 Supra note 15, at 639. 
281 Tarrant (2011), supra note 279. 
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from dormant Commerce Clause challenge.”282 The court also 
refused to address Tarrant’s challenges of Oklahoma export statutes 
calling such challenges “not justiciable.”283  
The Court of Appeals then focused its review on the issue of 
preemption, and whether the Compact gave Oklahoma “measures 
that otherwise might violate the dormant Commerce Clause.”284 The 
decision gave determinative weighting to language in the Red River 
Compact.285 The Court found §2.01 gave each state virtually 
exclusive domain over water allocated to it, citing precedent created 
in New England Power v. New Hampshire and Lewis v. BT 
Investment.286 The Court stated it is “well settled that Congress may 
use its powers under the Commerce Clause to confer ‘upon the 
                                                 
282 Infra at 51. 
283 Infra at 51.  
284 Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann D.C. No. 5:07-CV-
00045-HE No. 10-6184 (2011) at 4. 
285 Id. 
286 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 
(1982) at 340-341; Lewis v. BT Investment Mangers Inc., 447 U.S. 27 
(1980). 
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States an ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they 
would not otherwise enjoy.”287  
The language in §2.01 of the Compact gives each state the 
ability to “freely administer water rights and uses”. The Court 
determined “[b]y ratifying that Oklahoma may “freely administer” 
apportioned water and use it “in any manner” the state deems 
beneficial, Congress conferred broad regulatory authority on the 
state using unqualified terms.”288 The Court cited in its reasoning an 
excerpt of the interpretive comments, which provide, “each state is 
free to continue its existing internal water administration, or to 
modify it in any manner it deems appropriate.”289 The Court added, 
“[t]he broad language of key Compact provisions inoculates the 
Oklahoma statutes challenged here from dormant Commerce Clause 
attack.”290 From this perspective, the Compact represented 
                                                 
287 New England Power, supra at 340-41, Lewis v. BT Investment 
Managers, Inc. 447 U.S. 27 (1980) at 44.  
288 Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann D.C. No. 5:07-CV-
00045-HE No. 10-6184 (2011) at 25. 
289 Id. at 25, citing Appellate Application. Vol. I, 251.   
290 Id. at 24. 
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affirmative consent by Congress to infringe upon the Commerce 
Clause.    
D. Supreme Court 
While the Supreme Court affirmed the 10th Circuit, it went 
beyond the language contained within the Compact to rule that 
§5.05(b)(1) did not create cross-border water rights that preempt 
Oklahoma’s water statutes.291 The Court pointed to three factors to 
determine that “cross-border rights were not granted by the 
Compact:[(1)] the well-established principle that states do not easily 
cede their sovereign powers, …; [(2)] the fact that other interstate 
water compacts have treated cross-border rights explicitly; and [(3)] 
the parties’ course of dealing.”292 
Despite what the Supreme Court believes, Tarrant’s actions 
are not uncommon. City and water districts regularly have standing 
calls to purchase water while they simultaneously seek 
                                                 
291 Tarrant, supra note 15. 
292 Tarrant, supra note 15 at 628.   
2019] Borderless Commons 161 
unappropriated water.293 The Court also considered the gap of time 
between the passage of the Red River Compact in 1980 and 
Tarrant’s application for Oklahoma’s water in 2007.294 The Court 
believed that Tarrant, or some other entity in Texas, would have 
attempted to claim Oklahoma water sometime before the 2007 
application if they believed it was possible under the Compact.295 
Yet, the Court’s logic overlooks both the physical difficulties in 
moving large quantities of bulk water and the rate of increasing 
water demand during the 2000s in the Dallas-Fort Worth 
‘metroplex.’296 To juxtapose the  silence in §5.05(b)(1), the Supreme 
Court cited the Bear River Compact which “unambiguously permits 
signatory States to cross each other’s borders . . .” by stating “[N]o 
state shall deny the right of another signatory state, any person or 
entity of another signatory state, to acquire rights to the use of water 
                                                 
293 The cities of Santa Fe, New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
El Paso, Texas, and the Municipal Water District in California have all run 
simultaneous efforts to appropriate new water and purchase existing 
rights.  See generally, Ari Michelsen and Robert Young, Optioning 
agricultural water rights for urban water supplies during 
drought, American Journal of Agricultural Economics (1993). 
294 Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 637. 
295 Id.  
296 Id. at 634. 
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or to construct or to participate in the construction and use of 
diversion works and storage reservoirs with appurtenant works, 
canals, and conduits in one state for use of water in another state, 
either directly or by exchange.”297 In evaluating the parties’ course 
of dealing, the Court pointed to Tarrant’s actions and found it odd 
that it would simultaneously seek purchases of water and attempt to 
appropriate unallocated water.298   
The Court also addressed Tarrant’s claim that there was 
unallocated water within Oklahoma to which they were entitled.299 
Each state received an equal share (25 %) of Reach 2 sub-basin 5. 
Because §2.01 of the Compact gives each state the right to “use the 
water allocated to it by this Compact in any manner deemed 
                                                 
297 Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 633-34 
(1984); See generally Bear River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-189, Art. VIII., 
94 Stat. 4 (1978); The Yellowstone River Compact also addresses this 
issue stating, “[a] lower signatory State shall have the right, by compliance 
with the laws of an upper signatory State, except as to legislative-consent, 
to file application for and receive permits to appropriate and use any 
waters in the Yellowstone River System not specifically apportioned to or 
appropriated by such upper State…” Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. 
No. 231, Art. VII, 65 Stat. 663. 
298 “Tarrant’s earlier offer to purchase water from Oklahoma was a 
strange decision if Tarrant believed the Compact entitled it to demand 
water without payment.” Id. at 637. 
299 Id. at 639. 
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beneficial by that state.”300 Oklahoma’s allocation of 25% of the 
“excess flow” of water is for its exclusive use.301 The Court added 
requiring the OWRB to determine the total amount of water 
available in Oklahoma beyond the 25% cap would be 
“Herculean.”302 The Court’s finding is both disturbing and 
surprising because precipitation data coupled with stream and 
reservoir gages make such measurement possible. The United States 
Geological Survey and the United State Bureau of Reclamation 
compile these data with regular frequency and can estimate the 
volume and speed with which reservoirs will fill after a given 
precipitation event.303 The Court’s willingness to categorize runoff 
determinations as both laborious and logistically infeasible is 
partially understandable since neither of the parties in Tarrant 
                                                 
300 Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, §2.01, 94 Stat. 3305 
(1980). 
301 Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 639.  
302 Id. at 634.  
303 See generally Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, 
Manuals and Standards: Guidelines for Collecting Data to Support 
Reservoir Water Quality and Hydrodynamic Simulation Models (2009), 
https://www.usbr.gov/tsc/techreferences/mands/mands-
pdfs/hydromodels.pdf. 
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presented conclusive data showing the runoff from within their 
boundaries. 
The Court evaded determining whether Oklahoma’s out of 
state appropriation statutes violate the Commerce Clause. This was, 
in part, because of Tarrant’s argument that some of Reach 5 was 
“unallocated” and thereby available.304 The Court stated, “[t]he 
Oklahoma water statutes cannot discriminate against interstate 
commerce with respect to unallocated waters because the Compact 
leaves no waters unallocated.”305 The Court does state Texas or any 
other signatory state is free to challenge Oklahoma under Section 
2.11 if they feel Oklahoma is applying more than their 25% share to 
a beneficial use.306 Tarrant’s claim Oklahoma infringed on its right 
to apply unappropriated water to beneficial use failed "for the reason 
that the Compact does not create any cross-border rights in signatory 
States” and all the water was “allocated.”307    
                                                 
304 Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 639. 
305 Id. at 640. 
306 Id at 639. 
307 Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 639-40. 
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E. Get Ready for a Rematch? 
What is unclear is whether the provision allowing states to 
“use the water allocated to it by this Compact in any manner deemed 
beneficial by that state”308 allows Oklahoma to prevent any 
interstate transfer of water. This distinction requires seeing the 
subtle difference between the allocation of water under the compact 
and the ‘normal’ appropriation process by which a private party 
establishes a water right. Normally, unappropriated waters are held 
in trust by the state and are subject to appropriation.309 Oklahoma 
never objected to Tarrant’s claim unappropriated water exists in the 
Kiamichi River, and the right of out-of-state parties to appropriate 
unappropriated waters is settled law.310 Denying Tarrant the 
opportunity to appropriate the unappropriated waters of the 
Kiamichi River creates confusion. In Tarrant, the Court stated that 
                                                 
308 Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, §2.01, 94 Stat. 3305 
(1980). 
309 Gould, George A, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party 
Effects, 23 Land and Water Law Review 1-41, 28, (1988).  
310 Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 632-33 n.10. (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 565-566 n. 3 (2009) which states  ‘Congress does not cavalierly 
pre-empt’ ” state laws, adding, “When the States themselves have drafted 
and agreed to the terms of a compact, and Congress’ role is limited to 
approving that compact, there is no reason to invoke the presumption.”). 
For out-of-state parties appropriating water, see City of El Paso v. 
Reynolds, supra note 3.  
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the Compact did not grant cross-border rights.311 A plain reading 
would suggest that the Court discussed water that had been allocated 
under the compact, meaning Tarrant could not appropriate 
unallocated water under the Compact.312 However, it may be 
possible for Tarrant to appropriate unappropriated water in the 
Kiamichi River.  
The Court did not address this specific difference directly as 
Tarrant did not make this argument. This clearly leaves the door 
open for Tarrant to attempt to appropriate water or to purchase 
perfected water rights in Oklahoma derived from Oklahoma’s 
allocation of Red River water. The Compact allows Oklahoma to, 
“use the water allocated to it by this Compact in any manner deemed 
beneficial by that state.”313   
It may be possible for Tarrant to appropriate water for a use 
recognized as beneficial in Oklahoma. It could also purchase 
perfected water rights being used for a ‘beneficial use’ in Oklahoma. 
These actions would fall beyond the narrow ruling of the Court. If 
                                                 
311 Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 634. 
312 Id. at 639. 
313 Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, §2.01, 94 Stat. 3305 
(1980).  
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Tarrant does this it will either have to comply with Oklahoma’s 
strict standards of review for out of state transfers of water or go 
through a lengthy constitutional challenge using the standards 
outlaid in Sporhase. If Tarrant had tried to perfect a water right 
under Oklahoma law or attempted to transfer a valid right these 
issues would have been clearly before the Court. However, Tarrant’s 
flawed argument that unallocated water was present proved fatal to 
its case. 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TARRANT 
Tarrant leaves unanswered questions about the transferability of 
several types of water within a River Basin governed by an interstate 
compact. Most major western interstate rivers are already governed 
by interstate compacts, and the amendment process for these make 
it highly unlikely they will be modified by the signatory states.314 
Many of these compacts were ratified before the ‘era of water 
markets’ began in the 1970s, and it could be argued that many 
contain language that is intentionally obstructionist. Like the Red 
                                                 
314 See generally Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation 
Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence becomes the vice of 
Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 180 (2003). 
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River Compact, many compacts are devoid of explicit language on 
water transfers across state lines.315   
It is probable that the impact of Tarrant will be minimal—
the court determined the Red River Compact’s allocation scheme in 
§5.05 fully partitioned the water in sub-basin 5, so Tarrant could not 
claim water was unallocated. However, courts could interpret this 
case more broadly as a precedent for other compacts. If so, the 
question remains whether compacts that are silent about interstate 
transferability means that those compacts fully allocate water 
between states. For example, the Colorado River Compact was 
ratified in 1928 and divides water between “Upper Basin” and 
“Lower Basin” states.316 The Colorado River Compact does not 
specifically allocate water between states, but does state, “[t]he 
provisions of this article shall not apply to or interfere with the 
regulation and control by any State within its boundaries of the 
appropriation, use, and distribution of water.”317 This language is 
                                                 
315 See generally McCormick, The Use of Interstate Compacts to 
Resolve Transboundary Water Allocation Issues, supra 168. 
316 See Colorado River Compact, Ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1064 (1921).  
317 Colorado River Compact, Ch. 42, Art. IV(c), 45 Stat. 1064 
(1921).  
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similar to that contained in the Red River Compact. Does this rather 
generic language represent an explicit intent to preclude voluntary 
transfers of water across state lines? For example, if an irrigator in 
Utah attempts to reallocate water to a buyer in Nevada, is that a 
violation of the Compact?    
Similarly, the Rio Grande Compact allocates water between 
Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas using an inflow-outflow 
model.318 Section 11 states, “…nothing herein shall be interpreted 
to prevent recourse by a signatory state to the Supreme Court of the 
United States for redress should the character or quality of the water, 
at the point of delivery, be changed hereafter by one signatory state 
to the injury of another.”319 Based on the Court’s quite literal 
interpretation of the Red River Compact, does this mean any 
change, even if accomplished through a voluntary transfer of water 
rights between two private parties in differing states, is subject to 
challenge via the Rio Grande Compact? Under such vague language, 
can the state of origin preclude its citizen from exercising their 
                                                 
318 Rio Grande Compact, Ch. 155, Art. IV, 53 Stat. 155 (1938).  
319 Rio Grande Compact, Ch. 155, Art. XI, 53 Stat. 155 (1938).  
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perfected water right in a different beneficial use, and if so, does this 
constitute legal takings requiring just compensation?     
Oklahoma’s overtly protectionist statutes on out of state 
water applications320 appear unconstitutional. The court did state 
“nor do Oklahoma’s laws run afoul of the Commerce Clause,”321 
whether this is because there was no “unallocated” water, or whether 
the court made a determination based on the validity of these statutes 
was not specified.322 The Court’s statement runs in direct conflict to 
the precedent established in Sporhase which recognized water as an 
article of commerce and creates a high bar for exclusionary statutes. 
This suggests the court did not address Oklahoma’s statutes directly. 
Until future litigation provides clarity, the exact extent to which 
Oklahoma or another state can impose barriers on the exportation of 
water subject to an interstate compact remains unclear.323   
                                                 
320 Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 624-626. 
321 Id. at 640. 
322 Id.  
323 See George C. Coggins, Grizzly Bears Don’t Stop at Customs: A 
Preface to Transboundary Problems in Natural Resources Law, 32 U. 
Kan. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1983), and Olen P. Matthews, & Michael Pease, The 
Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts, and Marketing Water Across 
State Boundaries, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601, 656 (2006), for a more 
expansive review. 
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Tarrant also fails to clarify whether Texas or other states can 
purchase perfected water rights from willing sellers in Oklahoma 
and transfer this water out of state. Although the Court determined 
that “the Compact creates no cross-border rights in Texas,”324 
Tarrant or other water districts could possibly purchase water from 
upstream water rights holders in Oklahoma and extract those waters 
from the mainstem of the Red River at its South Bank. Under most 
hydrologic conditions, Texas must already ‘enter’ Oklahoma to 
extract water from the Red River as the border between the two 
states is the South “cut-bank.”325 To stop a purchase, the OWRB 
would likely invoke its water transfer statutes; such an action could 
make the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s export laws ripe for 
review. Such a scenario would seem to be similar in legal structure 
to that of Sporhase,326 in which the Supreme Court shot down 
economic protectionist statutes in Nebraska, unless the Court gives 
                                                 
324 Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 637. 
325 See Oklahoma v. Texas 260 U.S. 606, 636 (1923). 
326 See generally Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
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the phrase, “use the water allocated to it by this Compact in any 
manner deemed beneficial by that state”327 determinative weighting.   
Taking this uncertainty further, it is unclear whether the 
ruling in Tarrant precludes ‘water wheeling,’ an associative 
conveyance process by which water which would traditionally have 
gone to user ‘A’ instead goes to user ‘B,’ and user ‘B’s’ water then 
goes to user ‘C.’ Wheeling is conducted when physical barriers 
make moving water directly from user ‘A’ to user ‘C’ difficult.328 
Wheeling utilizes the diffusion of runoff down a watercourse as a 
way of limiting the amount of infrastructure needed. A niche of the 
natural resource economics and water resource management 
suggests consideration of wheeling as a method for redistributing 
water between users in areas of adequate supply to those in areas 
experiencing scarcity.329    
                                                 
327 Red River Compact, 94 Stat. 3305, §2.01, Pub. L. No. 96-564 
(1980). 
328 See generally Timothy H. Quinn, Wheeling Provisions of the 
Model Water Transfer Act, 14 HASTINGS W.—NW. J. ENVTL. LAW & 
POL’Y 727, 738 (2008). 
329 See e.g., David Zetland, How Markets Can End Persistent Intra-
organizational Conflict, 6 THE ECONOMICS OF PEACE AND SECURITY 
JOURNAL 22, 22-28 (2011), and Terry L. Anderson, & Pamela 
Snyder,WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE PUMP (1997).  
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The Red River Compact, like many western interstate 
compacts, ignores groundwater.330 This is unsurprising; many of 
these compacts were negotiated before conjunctive management of 
surface and ground waters were legally codified. This omission has 
had unintended and confusing implications.331 Because ground 
water is not covered under the compact,332 it is unclear whether 
Texas could purchase groundwater from a willing upstream seller in 
Oklahoma and extract those waters at the South bank of the Red 
River. Geographical transfers of groundwater like this are legal 
within Oklahoma.333 In Sporhase, the Court upheld an irrigator’s 
right to transfer groundwater from Nebraska to Colorado, calling 
                                                 
330 See McCormick (1994), supra note 167.  
331 On the Pecos River groundwater pumping caused depletion in 
surface water supplies, leading to a shortfall in New Mexico’s water 
delivery to Texas. See Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983); See 
Emlen G. Hall, HIGH AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO STRUGGLE 
FOR THE PECOS RIVER 291 (2002), for a thorough review of this issue. 
332 See Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222, 1236 
(10th Cir. 2011) (“Sporhase is distinguishable because Nebraska was 
attempting to regulate the interstate transfer of groundwater that was not 
subject to an interstate compact.”).  
333 “Water turned into any natural or artificial watercourse by any 
party entitled to the use of such water may be reclaimed below and 
diverted therefrom by such party, subject to existing rights, due 
allowance for losses being made by the Board.” Okla. Stat. tit. 82, 
§105.4. 
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Nebraska’s attempt to block the transfer, despite the fact the same 
transfer would be legal in Nebraska “an impermissible burden on 
interstate commerce.”334   
The legality of transferring water from Tribes across state 
boundaries is unclear. Tarrant attempted to transfer water from the 
Apache,335 Choctaw, and Chickasaw Nations.336 While those deals 
fell through, the transferability of Tribal waters remains a 
possibility. The Compact generically states, “[n]othing in this 
Compact shall be deemed to impair or affect the powers, rights, or 
obligations of the United States, or those claiming under its 
authority, in, over and to water of the Red River Basin.”337 This 
suggests that the Apache, Choctaw, and Chikasaw nation’s waters 
fall outside the purview of the Red River Compact. States would 
find it difficult to argue tribal waters are subject to state review in 
its attempt to block the transfer. It is unclear whether the state of 
origin would have legal standing to attempt to block such a transfer.  
                                                 
334 Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 941-42 (1982).  
335 See Tarrant, 656 F.3d at 1222.  
336 Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 624. 
337 Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, §2.07, 94 Stat. 3305 
(1980). 
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Tarrant attempted to include the proposed Apache transfer 
within its challenge of Oklahoma’s Water transfer statutes. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s finding that the 
proposed Apache transfer issue was not ripe.338 As more tribal rights 
are quantified, the transferability of these waters will lead to 
litigation similar to Tarrant. At the time that Tarrant brought the 
claims, neither Tarrant nor the Apache Tribe had applied for 
transferring water with the OWRB. The Court stated that “[t]he 
relationship between the Red River Compact and surface water 
owned by the Apache Tribe is fraught with complex questions of 
federalism, tribal sovereignty, and the reserved water rights 
doctrine.”339 The Court also recognized this issue was not ripe 
because it is unclear “what rights the Apache Tribe has to Oklahoma 
surface water. . .”340 Tarrant’s legal strategy must be questioned. Its 
first error was not fully pursuing water appropriations and perfecting 
the rights before bringing this case. Tarrant also failed to purchase 
rights making the case ‘ripe’ before the court challenge.   
                                                 
338 Tarrant supra 281, syllabus at 4. 
339 See Tarrant, 656 F.3d at 1250. 
340 Id.  
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Most global Climate Models suggest water supply 
vulnerabilities are likely to intensify in upcoming decades.341 
Concurrently natural resource economists increasingly call for the 
expanded use of markets to allow the price of water to reflect its 
scarcity.342 Whether this case was a defeat for the marketing of water 
in all river basins governed by an interstate compact is unclear. What 
is clear is that Tarrant adds uncertainty rather than providing 
lucidity on cross-border water transfers. The unique language in the 
compact was the sole focus of the Court’s decision, suggesting the 
decision is very narrow in scope. It is quite possible this decision did 
not impact transboundary water reallocations.  
                                                 
341 See generally IPCC, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and 
Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (2012), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/SREX_Full_Report-
1.pdf., and Robert G. Varady et al., Transboundary adaptive management 
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border region, 26 Envtl. Sci. Pol’y., 102, 102-112 (2013). 
342 See generally David S. Brookshire et al., Western Urban Water 
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Gould, Transfer of Water Rights, 29 Nat. Resources J. 457, 478 (1989), 
and Charles W. Howe, Protecting Public Values in a Water Market 
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